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Book Reviews 
Shakespeare and the Jews by James Shapiro. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996. Pp. ix + 317. $29.95. 
The announced subject of James Shapiro's splendid new book is "what 
Shakespeare and his contemporaries thought about Jews" (1), but it is 
equally enlightening on the development of the Myth of Englishness and 
"what it meant to be English during a period marked by social, religious, 
and political instability" (57). Deeply influenced by the new historicism, 
Shapiro emphasizes the cultural power of formative narrative f for example 
the gradually solidifying stories of the expulsion of the Jews in 1290 and 
their presumptive "readmission" in 1656; yet by insisting on the significance 
of religion as a category of analysis, he expands new historicism's limited 
trinity of race, class, and gender, which tends to ignore a fundamental ele-
ment of English thought in the early modern period. Based on an enormous 
amount of scholarship both primary and secondary, the book illuminates 
English history and cultural attitudes as the same time that it proposes a 
provocative new reading of The Merchant of Venice and ranges through litera-
ture from Marlowe to Maria Edgeworth. 
Before turning to Shakespeare Shapiro describes a culture in which all 
forms of difference-Catholic/Protestant, nation/race, Jewish/Christian, 
even male/female-were contested and in constant danger of collapse. As 
the Spanish had found following the forced conversion of their Jewish popu-
lations, it is impossible to determine the truth of assertions of personal belief; 
one result was "false Jews and counterfeit Christians." Following the 1492 
expulsion of the Jews from Spain, small Marrano communities were estab-
lished in England, and contrary to conventional wisdom, "there were Jews in 
Shakespeare's England, though probably never more than a couple of hun-
dred at any given time." (For a fuller discussion see David Katz, The Jews in 
the History of England [Oxford, 1994J, to whom Shapiro acknowledges his 
debts, though he differs with Katz over how to describe the anomalous sta-
tus of the Jews in the later seventeenth century.) Given these limited num-
bers, the question of Jewish difference-racial, religious, national, even 
sexual (one accusation was that Jewish men menstruated)-was surprisingly 
"hot," debated in sermons and in parliament. Even the natives of the new 
world were brought into this discussion, some explorers alleging that they 
were the lost tribes, their incomprehenSible language a form of Hebrew. 
One reason for the obsessive interest in the Jews was that English Protes-
tants saw themselves as a newer version of God's elect: to define Englishness 
was necessarily to refer to Jewishness. At the same time, traditional accusa-
tions of economic, theological and physical crimes ascribed to Jews contin-
ued to circulate. In particular, early modern English writers were prone to 
consider ritual murder "the Jewish crime," in the words of Samuel Purchas. 
Some of Shapiro's most interesting speculations concern the psychological 
reasons for the continuing resonance of this libeL He proposes, among other 
things, that the belief that Jews abducted and murdered children was useful 
in explaining the disappearance of abandoned children, just as accusations of 
villainous usury projected English anxiety about the growth of economic ex-
ploitation after 1571, when the taking of interest up to 10% became legal. 
Furthermore, the allegation that Jews committed ritual murder to obtain 
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blood for their passover bread came uncomfortably close to Protestant En-
gland's discomfort over their "own Catholic and therefore cannibalistic past" 
(110). 
Peculiar to England was an additional accusation that before murdering 
abducted male children the Jews circumcised them. While modern readers 
may instinctively reach for psychological interpretations, Shapiro demon-
strates convincingly that for post-Reformation Elizabethans it was the theo-
logical implications, especially of Paul's "cryptic remarks" on circumcision, 
that determined the meaning of this ritual and incidentally "had an imlneas-
urable impact on Elizabethan conceptions of Jews" (117). In brief, English 
Protestants equated circumcision with the old laIN and its supersession by 
faith; the proper circumcision for Christians \vas instead inward and of the 
heart. For literary critics no doubt the most suggestive section of Shapiro's 
book is that in which he extends this finding into a reading of The Merchant 
o/Venice. 
\A/hen Shylock first proposes to exact a pound of Antonio's flesh, "to be 
cut off and taken" in that part of Antonio's body that best "pleaseth" him, he 
does not further clarify the bodily location. Indeed, it is not until the court-
room scene that Shylock asserts his intention to cut from a spot nearest An-
tanio's heart. But for an Elizabethan, Shapiro claims, the threat to cut a 
pound of Antonio's flesh would have suggested emasculation. Not only is 
"flesh" the consistent sixteenth-century term for penis (Shapiro cites the Ge-
neva Bible), but in one of Shakespeare's sources, Alexander Silvayn's The Or~ 
ator, the Jew's intention to castrate is overt, as is the Christian's in a related 
anecdote that reverses the parties, recounted in Gregorio Leti's Life of Pope 
Shtus the Fifth. Shylock's decision to cut from Antonio's heart is, then, "the 
height of the literalism that informs all of his actions," as he is cutting his 
Christian adversary "in that part of the body where the Christians believe 
themselves to be truly circumcised: the heart" (127). Antonio's demand that 
Shylock become a Christian is a metaphorical "uncircumcision": Antonio and 
Shylock "to the last seek out ... symbolic acts that convert their adversary 
into their own kind" (130). 
The Merchant of Venice has "emerged as a touchstone of cultural identifica-
tion" (10) and Shylock as the prototypical figure of Renaissance Jewishness 
(see John Gross, Shylock: A Legend and Its Legacy [New York, 1992]). Never-
theless, Shapiro suggests, H was the economic strength of other resident 
aliens-French, Dutch, Italian, Portuguese-rather than Jewish usury, that 
really worried Londoners in the period of The Merchant of Venice. Civic au-
thorities undertook a full census of aliens in 1593, and there was II a riot upon 
the strangers" (187) in 1595, not long before Merchant 0/ Venice was pro-
duced. In fact, what makes Shylock vulnerable to Portia's legal sleight-of-
hand is the law against resident aliens: as so often happens, the play 
"reproduces the practice of translating anti-alien into anti-Jewish sentiment" 
(189). And Shapiro is not hesitant about showing how such sentiment per-
sists. Some for whom Shakespeare's age represents a time of pristine 
"Englishness" have objected vigorously to Jewish scholars who trespass "on 
the banks of the Avon," beginning with Israel Gollancz, the first Jewish pro-
fessor of English literature in England and continuing, in one recent and vig-
orously anti-semitic list, through Stephen Greenblatt (Eliot Baker, Bardolalry 
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[1992], cited by Shapiro, 81). Shapiro sees such excesses as a manifestation of 
the "cultural anxieties that continue to circulate ... around the twin poles of 
'Shakespeare' and the 'Jews'" (83), though he also points out that the English 
of Shakespeare's own period, unlike the Spanish, never were guilty of po-
groms, forced conversions, inquisition or other violence against the n011-
Christians in their midst. 
The latter parts of Shapiro's book trace the repeated attempts, especially in 
the Whitehall conference of 1655 and the debate over the "Jew Bill" of 1753, 
to determine precisely the status of the Jews of England. Neither citizens nor 
aliens, many took on the anomalous status of "denizens." But sixteenth-cen-
tury attitudes about "the racial, national and criminal nature of the Je\vs" 
(199) persisted, and in the mid-eighteenth century debate about naturalizing 
the Jews Shakespeare's play \vas once again enlisted. Further confirmation of 
Shapiro's reading of Shylock comes from some of the allusions to a "knife-
wielding, circumcising, castrating Shylock" of this period (219). 
In teaching The Merchant of Venice one is often faced with overly-reductive 
undergraduate interpretations based on a series of binary oppositions: Chris-
tian and Jew, usurer and generous friend, Belmont and Venice. Shapiro's 
study suggests that an over-arching question of sameness and difference, 
both for Shakespeare's play and for many of the Bard's contemporaries, was 
that behveen Englishness and Jewishness. This contrast raised in its most 
acute form the question of what, precisely, constituted a national identity. As 
a study of culhlral formation Shapiro's enlightening book thus expands our 
familiarity with the thought patterns and gives us increased access to the 
central questions \vhich troubled early modern Englishmen, not least of all 
Shakespeare. 
Loyola University-Chicago Suzanne Gossett 
Clilllale alld Literature'; Reflections of Environmel1t edited by Janet Perez <1nd 
\Vendell Aycock. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, ]995. Pp. 144. 
$30.00. 
On the day I read this book the temperature where J live plummeted to 26 
degrees below zero-not a record low but near it, and a st8.rk contrast with 
the ]03 degrees reached seven months earlier in July 1995. For the record, 
the <1\'erage surface temper<1ture of the earth in 1995 was 59.7, the highest 
registered since tr8.cking began in ]866, with the following years running 
do,c behind: 1990, 1991, 1988, 1981, 1987, 1983, 1980, ond 1989. A, e\'en'-
body knO\\·s ,,·ho reads ne\\"sPJpers or watches tele\·ision, the glob,d \,·<1rl11-
ing of the IJst decade h<1s recast sl11all t<1lk about the \\"cJther into an 
unfolding apncalyptic dral11<J, In the (,Jrl~· da~·s nf Jllctcnrolog~· 5cil'ntist5-=- (011-
(ei\"t.~d "cliIllJte" as <l more or less stClble regiml" which they could rl'prl'~l'nl 
b~· ,l\·cragcs, while "wcather" rcfL'ITCd In tlllctllJting ((1Jlditinns. The 
plw!" C'lr~· S. Elbm,· rcminds us, in JIl here \~n "The Endk'ss pI 
DL'alh and Dl'5tlbtil)J1 in CJrcia \\;lrqul'z's Stnril''','· th,l! "climatL' rL'll'r .... 
\ll the c(lnditill!l5 thJt \,·,luld Il(lrm'lll~· be l'\.pl'cll'd tll nCCllr ,1\ ~(l!lll' 111(,lti(l1l 
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during a specific time of year" (80). What he neglects to mention is that cli-
matic conditions have changed drastically in the three million years or so 
during which people have inhabited the earth, and that after millennia of 
either disregarding or depending on it, climate is no longer available as a 
symbol of predictability, eternal recurrence or even normal expectation. 
Climate and Literature appears at a time when literary critics have begun to 
apply the insights of environmentalism and cultural geography to the analy-
sis of literary texts, and when cultural studies has turned its attention to the 
possibility of a green cultural criticism. Not without flaws, the collection 
nevertheless deserves the attention of a wide audience. At their least inter-
esting the essays tend simply to observe the weather, which in Latin Ameri-
ca, we are told more than once, can get awfully hot and rainy. At their best, 
the essays suggest an exciting new direction for an entire field of interdisci-
plinary work, and the importance of comparative and ecological approaches 
to it. 
Bob Dylan famously observed that "You don't need a weatherman to 
know which way the wind blows." Yet specialized fields such as glaciology, 
dendrochronology, paleoclimatology have profoundly transformed our daily 
experience of the weather. 'While science shapes our understanding of cli-
matic processes as they extend through space and time, computer modeling 
and satellite technologies, developed for studying the weather, have infil-
trated other cultural realms. The study of chaos emerged in the 1960s with 
attempts to simulate weather patterns, and it was a meteorologist, Edward 
Lorenz of MIT, who introduced the idea of the "butterfly effect" in complex 
systems to explain how small differences in input become magnified as out-
put (a theory widely disseminated through popular culture and films such 
as Jurassic Park). 
This collection brings together thirteen essays that study the cultural im-
pact of climate, focusing on "ancient and modern literary reflections of cli-
mates real and imagined" (2). The scope is broadly historical and the texts 
under analysis range from classical poetry to modern fiction and poetry in 
English, French, and Spanish. Climatological thought has a long history and 
the editors have wisely avoided locating the problematic in a single national 
context. In the opening essay Rosemary Nielsen and Robert Solomon care-
fully attend to water imagery in Horace's "Parade Odes," and connect fluc-
tuations in water-states to lithe possibility, especially during imperial 
consolidation, of renewed chaos on social, politicat religious, and sexual 
scales" (10). Contrasting Horace's outlook, witl, its "rage for order" and fear 
of disintegration, to twentieth-century fractal geometry and chaos theory 
(which takes a considerably more benign view of turbulence), they study 
chaos as an evolving metaphor in the representation of nature. Another es-
say, by Stephen Newmeyer, takes up the writings of the medieval Jewish 
philosopher and poet Jehuda Halevi, who appropriated Greek climatological 
theories to promote a return to the Holy Land. v\That emerges from New-
meyer's faSCinating account is an early expression of climatological deter-
minism: Halevi considered the climate of Palestine especially salutary, 
making it the ideal site for the reestablishment of the Jewish people. Halevi's 
major philosophical work, the Kuzari, argues, in terms parallel to the case 
made by Greek and Roman writers for the superiority of their climates and 
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national cultures, that geography conditions identity: "There are places in 
which particular plants, metals, or animals are found, or where the inhabi-
tants are distinguished by their form and character, since perfection or defi-
ciency of the soul are produced by the mingling of elements" (23-24). From 
here it was a short logical leap to his assertion, which echoes a passage from 
the Talmud, that "the atmosphere of the Holy Land makes [one] wise" (24) 
-a theory that explains something of the intense longing that has character-
ized Jewish life in the diaspora. 
The relation of cultural identity to a national space also comes up in Jack 
Jordan's essay on "Climate and Identity in the Literature of the French An-
tilles." Jordan divides the francophone literatures of the Caribbean into three 
periods. In the first, current between the 1840s and the 1930s, writers cast 
Martinique and Guadeloupe in the soft tropical glow we now associate with 
Club Med brochures. During the second period, and under the influence of 
the negritude movement, which grounded black cultural identity in African 
language and customs, the poet Airne Cesaire looked to Africa rather than to 
his native Martinique for an aesthetic and sense of identity. Later in his ca-
reer, however, Cesaire figured the Antillian landscape as a map of authentic-
ity and identification. In a 1977 interview he described himself as "un 
hornme de terre, de montagne et de feu/' and continued: "In my sensibility 
the mountain [Mont Pelee] plays a very great role because I am a Martini-
can, and because at the horizon of the Martinican sensibility there is always 
the presence of the mountain" (1l8). Jordan shows how writers of a third, or 
"creole," period in the literature of the French Antilles rejected essentialism 
and embraced a regionalism that moved them "from looking for identity in 
an abstract, unifying universal to rooting it in a cross-cultural poetics, itself 
inseparable from the climate and landscape unique to the islands" (119). 
The relation of climatological influence to the construction of national 
identity is explored in several other essays. Wendell McClendon's "Zola's 
Uses of Climate in The Land" isolates passages describing the physical envi-
ronment in La Terre to make a compelling argument about the practice of lit-
erary naturalism. As McClendon shows, Zola's novel systematically mingles 
human and non-human nature: its unrelenting emphasis on the elements 
imputes a powerful agency to weather, and its portrayal of fictional charac-
ters turns subjectivity itself into a sort of climatic effect. La Terre, McClendon 
contends, induces in its readers a feeling of powerlessness, as if they were 
"witness to an immense and unjust natural disaster, non-human on the sur-
face but in which human beings are clearly implicated" (51). In the world of 
the novel, natural "law," figured as a massive and mechanical cyclicality, 
forces puny human actors into compliance. The contributors to Climate and 
Literature sometimes slip into such a mode of thinking themselves. Mc-
Clendon's contribution demonstrates both the strengths and limitations of 
this approach, its capacity to transform particular discursive features into 
something subtle and deserving of careful analysis, alongside a tendency to 
mystify the natural as an autonomous and eternal order. Raquel Romeu, for 
example, in an essay on the influence of climate in the fiction of Alejo Car-
pentier and Mario Vargas Llosa, argues that "the diversity of climates in 
Peru and other South American countries generally has resulted in a plural-
ity of cultures, producing serious economic, political and even moral prob-
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lems" (110). Without denying the importance of climate to food production 
and to resource and health-care issues, we need to read these factors in con-
junction with the political and teclmological problems at the root of social in-
justice, rather than positing a direct monocausal relationship between 
weather and regional development. 
The sole essay among the thirteen that turns directly to ecology for insight 
is one of the best, and concludes the volume: Luis A. Jimenez's "Afro-Cuban 
Culture, Ecology, and Climate in 'La comparsa' by Felipe Pichardo Moya." 
Jimenez draws on Eugene P. Odum's concept of the "biotic community" to 
read "La cornparsa," a 1916 poem about carnival celebration. Jimenez cites 
Odum's textbook Fundamentals of Ecology, which played a major part in revo-
lutionizing ecology in the 1950s and 1960s by foregrounding the concept of 
the "ecosystem." Odum's style of systems ecology is basically holistic, taking 
community organization as a basic structural unit, in contrast with a reduc-
tionist approach that explains wholes by reference to constituent parts. The 
value of such concepts to both social ecologists and If ecocentrics" -so-called 
red-greens and green-greens-is considerable. Jimenez's dual purpose in this 
essay is to demonstrate the origin of Afro-Cuban customs in African tradi-
tion, and to "illustrate how the collective feelings of the group are molded to 
a climatic and ecological unity" (129). Jimenez's essay succeeds admirably at 
the first task, but his discovery of climatic conditions "reflected" in the mu-
sic, dance, and cultural practices of the Afro-Cuban community finally seems 
less satisfying. 111e essay deftly reiterates the premise of the entire collection, 
that climate is a given we can find mirrored in literary texts. Yet any direct 
correlation of regional and national cultures with biomes tends to occlude 
the non-climatic variables (political, ideological, and economic) that mediate 
our experience of nature. 
What all of the essays reveal is that interaction between social and envi-
ronmental factors, culture and climate, remains so tightly imbricated that we 
cannot separate one from the other. Ever since the French naturalist Buffon 
attacked American climate and moral capacity (and Thomas Jefferson rose to 
their defence), there have been attempts to link climate with culli,ral differ-
ence. The nineteenth-century promoter of Western expansion, William Gil-
pin, hypothesized the existence of an "isothermal belt" where higher cultures 
thrived, which followed a westward trajectory from Athens and Rome to 
Topeka and Denver. At the turn of the century the Yale geographer Ell-
sworth Huntington theorized differences alTIOng human races by reference to 
climatic factors, plotting on maps and graphs indices such as health, longevi-
ty, industrial output, and level of "civilization." In Huntington's racialized 
hierarchy, Britain and the Atlantic seaboard scored a perfect 100, while coun-
tries situated in the tropics ranked very low. New paradigms for studying 
the relation of climate to culture will avoid such transparent absurdities, but 
will still need to come to terms with the realization that climate is both an-
thropogenic and subject to severe overall variability. This collection reminds 
us that climate has a history, which can be read in novels and poetry as well 
as in landscape or statistical records. It opens vistas on an important topic 
just as our ideas about it are undergoing a revolution. 
University of Iowa Alvin Snider 
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Disturbing Pleasllres: Lenrning Popular ClIlture by Henry A. Giroux. New York 
Routledge, 1994. Pp. xi + 202. $52.50 cloth; $16.95 paper. 
Making Malcolm: The Myth & Meaning of Malcolm X by Michael Eric Dyson. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. xxi + 215. $19.95· cloth; $10.95 
paper. 
A great deal gets written, and said, these days about the "public intellec-
tual," and whether or not such a thing, or person, can still meaningfully ex-
ist, with the frequently stated corollary that if the times were better, so too 
would be the people who serve them. But is this really true, or is the whole 
so-called argument just another-perhaps more palatable-way of saying 
that "we" who make such claims don't like the intellectuals we've got, so 
rather than dignifying their presence wi th reasoned response, we'd prefer 
simply to define them out of existence? In other words, for the sake of a cer-
tain homebound comfort we would prefer not to do the intellectual work 
that comes too visibly to hand, so a pose of nostalgic know-nothingism (per-
haps no pose at all) is more expedient. 
In his new collection of essays, Henry Giroux returns to Adorno's injunc-
tion that "it is part of morality not to be at home in one's home" (147), and 
then offers a useful critique of the unawareness-regardless of how inten-
tional-that informs much posturing about the question of intellectual work, 
and the institutional encounter with the "Other," which is the greatest public 
challenge now confronting America's academic middle class. Giroux's proxi-
mate text, in his discussion of intellectual homes, is the work of Paulo Freire, 
specifically Freire's pedagogy of "critical literacy" (141). Giroux differentiates 
between the locatedness of Gramsci's "organic intellectual" and the 
"homelessness" of Freire as a "border intellectual": 
Of course, this is not meant to suggest that intellectuals have to go into 
exile to take up Freire's work, but it does suggest that in becoming 
border crossers, it is not uncommon for many of them to engage his 
work as an act of bad faith. Refusing to negotiate or deconstruct the 
borders that define their own politics of location .... [and] From the 
comforting perspective of the colonizing gaze, such theorists often ap-
propriate Freire's work without engaging its historical specificity and 
ongoing political project. (148) 
This failure of engagement-or rather the argument against it-is key, and 
key to the concerns that animate not only the current volume, but Giroux's 
whole career: as scholar, teacher, public figure. 
Henry A. Giroux is the Waterbury Chair Professor in Secondary Education 
at Pennsylvania State University; he is the author of numerous books and ar-
ticles, and is well known as a public and impassioned presenter of his work. 
Disturbing Pleasures collects (in revision) pieces that first appeared in such 
journals as Cultural Studies, College Literature, The Review of Education, and 
Cultural Crtique. There are nine essays in a11 (one of which is co-authored 
with Roger l. Simon); each makes good on the subtitle, "learning popular 
culture." That is what Giroux is doing here: learning the popular culture 
that, after Adorno, is the "home" we must work critically not to be at home 
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in; the home that Americans make for themselves with results that redound 
upon the rest of the world. The topics range from fashion advertising to Walt 
Disney, photography to the privatization of public education, academic cul-
tural studies to Paulo Freire. The discussion of Freire is particularly valu-
able, not only as a meditation on the possibilities of the "border intellectual," 
but as a cautionary reminder of how not to appropriate Freire's frequently 
over-popularized work. In other discussions-of Benetton advertising, or 
popular films (Good Morning, Vietnam; Pretty Woman; Grand Canyon)-Giroux 
shows himself an able reader, and teacher, of popular culture; it is here most 
vividly that he makes his case for a "pedagogy of representation" (89), and 
the responsibility intellectuals bear-particularly ones who are publicly 
funded-to undertake it: 
The challenge of a new cultural politics, one that takes popular and 
media culture seriously, is as much a pedagogical challenge as it is a 
political one. The issue for cultural workers is not merely to recognize 
the importance of cultural texts such as Good Morning, Vietnam and 
Pretty Woman in shaping social identities, but to address how represen-
tations are constructed and taken up through social memories that are 
taught, learned, mediated, and appropriated within particular institu-
tional and discursive formations of power. (45) 
Evident here, as throughout the book, is Giroux's commitment-for him as 
passionate as it is necessary-to the crucial relation between institutional 
work and public life: the one impossible in any meaningful sense without 
the other. 
This commitment has led him more than once into conflicts, from which 
he has never shrunk; and it leads him here, inevitably, into a consideration 
of "cultural studies," which is the stage on which a great deal of academic 
politics and presumption get publicly acted out. "I want to ... argue," Gi-
roux writes, 
that cultural studies is still too rigidly tied to the modernist academic 
disciplinary structures that it often criticizes.. . What it fails to do is 
to critically address a major prop of disciplinarity, which is the notion 
of pedagogy as a transparent vehicle for transmitting truth and knowl-
edge. . The haunting question here is, what is it about pedagogy 
that allows cultural studies theorists to ignore it? One answer may lie 
in the refusal of cultural studies theorists to either take schooling seri-
ously as a site of struggle or to probe how traditional pedagogy pro-
duces particular identities, how it constructs students through a range 
of social forms. (130) 
To his credit, Henry Giroux has never shied away from such concerns; he 
would doubtless accept as honorable the designation of his project-like the 
focus of his career generally-as "pedagogical." And for those who have 
used that term to dismiss his work as mere pedagogy the present essays are 
sufficient to discredit such condescension, particularly among people who 
ought to know better, much better. 
Like Giroux, Michael Eric Dyson is a scholar who has been subjected to 
r 
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criticism not so much because of the work he has done, which is admirable, 
but because of the label that has been attached to it, and him-through no 
particular wish of his own. Dyson is frequently grouped, these days, with a 
number of other African American academics who are taken to represent-
whether for or against-the last best hope of public intellectual life in the 
United States. (The example of Giroux alone is sufficient to challenge the au-
thority and exclusivity of such claims, but facts often have little meaning in 
the domain of publicity, where labels take the place of reasoned inquiry, and 
where prejudice too easily supplants truth.) Fortunately for us, Professor Dy-
son-like Professor Giroux-is quite capable of making his own case, if 
given the chance. 
That is precisely what he does in his second book, Making Malcolm, no less 
so than in his first one, Reflecting Black: African-American Cultural Criticism 
(University of Minnesota, 1993), which is a collection of essays and call-and-
response-like "Improvisations." (Professor Dyson is also an ordained Baptist 
minister, as well as adept at rap lyrics; his writing is lively, diverse, 
"engaged" as Henry Giroux might say.) The topics of the first book are vari-
ous, ranging from Michael Jackson to Toni Morrison, political correctness to 
gospel music, and including discussions of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mal-
colm X; the latter becomes the sole subject of Dyson'S second book. Makillg 
Malcolm is not in any extended sense a biography, however; nor is it a criti-
cal study of the man's "life and works," in the usual sense. Instead, it is the 
account of a personal and deeply felt encounter between Dyson and another 
African Alnerican whom he never met in life, but whom he comes to know 
by working through the various "myths" crated around Malcolm: 
As I have matured, journeying from factory worker to professor, it is 
the Malcolm who valued truth over habit who has appealed most to 
me, his ability to be self-critical and to change his direction an unfail-
ing sign of integrity and courage, But these two Malcolms need not be 
in ultimate, fatal conflict, need not be fractured by the choice behveen 
seeking an empowering racial identity and linking ourselves to the 
truth no matter what it looks like, regardless of color, class, gender, 
sex, or age. They are both legitimate guests, and Malcolm's career and 
memory are enabling agents for both pursuits, His complexity is our 
gift (17) 
As this passage suggests, the book is not only about Dyson's personal 
"meeting" with Malcolm; it is also about what has, and perhaps more ur-
gently, what c01lld occur if a more general, and historically informed, meet-
ing were to take place, inasmuch as Malcolm's "complexity is our gift." 
Like Henry Giroux, Michael Dyson comes from il working-class back-
ground. Subsequently, both men ha\'c been translated by' the academy and 
its culture into an alternate domain of pri\'ilege; the work of each is in-
scribed knowingly and in\'aluably by that experience of lea\'ing "home," the 
one a professor of education occupying an endowed chair, the other a profes-
501' of comll"lunication studies and Director of the Institute of African-Amcri-
can RC5carch at the L'ni\'l:r.5it~, of ?\:orth Carolina. "To comprehend the full 
s\\'cep of a fisurc's life and thought." D:'son write;;:, "it i5 nccc55ar~; to riZlcc 
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that figure's career in its culhlral and historical context and view the trends 
and twists of thought that mark significant periods of change and develop-
ment" (63). This procedure, which Dyson terms "trajectory analysis," is one 
he submits himself to-tellingly-no less so than his subject, Malcolm X, 
producing a running commentary all. the social construction of subject posi-
tions, with respect to class and race and-with special relevance-gender. 
The longest section of the book, "X Marks the Plots: A Critical Reading of 
Malcolm's Readers," offers a concise and valuable overview of the various 
"Malcolms" that readers have constructed, each plotting a different 
"trajectory," either more or less informed and self critical, with these trajec-
tories being organized generally according to four headings: " ... Malcolm as 
hero and saint, Malcolm as a public moralist, Malcolm as victim and vehicle 
of psychohistorical forces, and Malcolm as revolutionary figure judged by 
his career trajectory from nationalist to alleged socialist" (24). What follows 
this summary discussion are four examjnations of Malcolm in relation to 
specific topics: resurgent nationalism and rap; black film; Spike Lee's appro-
priation of Malcolm (which Dyson largely approves, proposing that "Never 
before in American cinema has an alternative black spirituality been so intel-
ligently represented" [139]); and contemporary American politics, especially 
with regard to the dangerous predicament of young African American 
males. The book concludes with a hopeful, if brief, meditation on "turning 
the corner" away frOlTI racial divisiveness and crude stereotyping. Of partic-
ular relevance and value-both for its insights and also for its method-is 
the discussion of Malcolm's impact on rap music and hip hop culture. Here 
Dyson treats popular texts not as many commentators do-particularly those 
espousing politically trendy causes-as cultural souvenirs that attest to the 
collector's hip authenticity, but as legitimate forms of cultural inquiry, con-
current with his own. "For the past decade," he writes, "rap artists-who as 
informal ethnographers of black youth culture translate the inarticulate suf-
fering of poor black masses into articulate anger-have warned of the geno-
cidal consequences of ghetto life for poor blacks" (163). It is a warning we 
have ignored at our peril, with the ghettoizing of "popular" culture, which 
both Dyson and Giroux work against, abetting an ignorance as dangerous as 
it is familiar. 
So, what to do? Both authors offer useful and insightful-sometimes in-
spired-suggestions that might be summed up using a term of the sociolo-
gist Richard Sennett, who wrote about the "hidden injuries of class." The 
injuries inflicted by class, together with race and gender as these have been 
variously constructed, are perhaps not so "hidden" now as they were more 
than thirty years ago, when SeIU1ett devised his term. That this is so is surely 
to the good, and due in no small measure to the work of authors such as 
Dyson and Giroux, who act and write as public intellectuals without trou-
bling lmnecessarily about whether or not they may be operating without a 
license. Their commitment and honesty are license enough (although it is 
possible to wish that Giroux could write sometimes with more of Dyson's 
straightforwardness, and Dyson would occasionally allow himself more of 
Giroux's extended scope of argument). Now that the cat is out of the bag 
culturally, with respect to the injuries we have done to each other, victims 
and victimizers alike, it's anybody's guess whether the academy will be up 
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to the public challenge that its own over-eager rhetoric invites, or \vhether 
the professors will turn this moment of opportunity into one more interne-
cine squabble the relevance of which remains purely "academic." If the latter 
happens, it will be against the strong counter examples offered by Michael 
Dyson and Henry Giroux. 
lAll7yl1e State University Jerry Herron 
Cultural Selection by Gary Taylor. New York: Basic Books, 1996. Pp. ix + 325. 
$26.00. 
In fourteen vignettes chosen to represent a day in the life of Shakespeare 
for a recent two-page spread in The New York Times Magazine entitled "All 
Shakespeare, All the Time," the only scholar named is Gary Taylor. Why 
should Gary Taylor be selected as the single academic to receive lnedia rec-
ognition in The Tillles? The moment illustrates the thesis of Taylor'S new 
book: gaining access to public attention involves a struggle for control of the 
mechanisms that regulate cultural selection. Taylor's inclusion implies oth-
ers' exclusion. 
In 1961 the British leftist Raymond Williams spoke the phrase that 
launched a thousand canon revisions. Thirty-five years later the echo of vVil-
Iiams' concept "selective tradition" can be heard in Taylor'S title Cu!tural 
Selection. But Taylor's assessment of the left's performance in our current cul-
ture wars is blunt. The left, he says, "lost the culture wars of the 1980s." A 
chief reason for defeat is the left's unwillingness and inabiHty to engage the 
popular media, the point of entry into widescale public discourse and de-
bate. Lack of engagement means that the left selects itself out of the competi-
tion before the battle begins, thereby giving up in advance. Taylor'S 
involvement with the media is thus part of his point. His drive to cross the 
threshold into the public arena is directly linked to his desire to remedy the 
left's failure. 
Some readers will dismiss Taylor's harsh indichnent of the left as exagger-
ated. But legitimate qualifications to his argument should not distract from 
the basic accuracy of his charge. Here is a decided imbalance in the respec-
tive impacts of right and left in the public debate about culture. Compara-
tively speaking, vVilliam Bennett, Allan Bloom, Lym1e Cheney, Dinesh 
d'Souza are household names. No equivalent roll call is possible on the left 
side. Gerald Graff's \\'ork has led to the formation of Teachers for a Demo-
cratic Culture, but the organization'S ne\\'sletter, while important, remains so 
obscure that it does not register on the scale of public attention. The content 
of John Guillory'S CIIlfllrn! Capital concerns class inequality in the distribu-
tion of cultural pri\'ilcge, but his style displays no desire to reach a wider 
audience. 
As the examples of VVilliam Bennett and L~'nne Cheney indicate, the 
power of the cultural right deriycs from its connection to Republican part~' 
politics. Again there is a \·acuum on the other side. The most prominent in-
stance of authentic affiliation \\·jth the Democratic part~' illustrates the di-
q 
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lemma. Arthur Schlesinger's Disuniting of America can provide no effective 
opposition because on cultural issues he is, according to Taylor's approriate 
label, "conservative." 
If Gary Taylor has identified a major problem on the left side of the cul-
ture wars, then how successful is his proposed alternative? Taylor's solution, 
which focuses on access to major mass media, needs to be assessed on tvvo 
levels. First, on a practical level, Taylor manifestly succeeds in breaking into 
the select circle of voices and ideas circulated by The New York Times, which 
reviewed Cultural Selection in both the daily and Sunday review spaces. 
A short review of Taylor's career suggests how remarkable this break-
through is, for his early reputation was made in the hitherto little-known 
field of textual editing. The stature of his work with Stanley Wells on the 
Oxford edition of Shakespeare is attested by its adoption as the text for the 
new Norton Shakespeare under the direction of Stephen Greenblatt. Taylor 
also co-edited with Michael Warren a collection on multiple texts of King 
Lear that initiated a major trend in rethinking principles of editing. But the 
specific cause of Taylor's emergence into public notoriety was the announce-
ment of his discovery of a new Shakespeare poem. Plucked out of Kansas 
like Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, Taylor landed on the front page of The New 
York Times, complete with photograph and "Man in the News" profile, on 
November 24, 1985. 
While this limelight treatment cannot have been entirely unwelcome, the 
sudden exposure must also have been a painful shock because of the contro-
versy it ignited over the authenticity of Taylor's attribution of the poem to 
Shakespeare. Taylor learned the hard way about the media's power and this 
experience marks the decisive turning point in the development of his ca-
reer. 
Showing admirable resilience and resourcefulness, Taylor used his unex-
pected celebrity to reinvent himself and to launch a new career as a public 
intellectual as the author of Reinventing Shakespeare. This popularly written, 
accessible book is the best comprehensive account of the revolutionary 
changes in Shakespeare criticism and is far superior to the main conservative 
rival, Brian Vickers' Appropriating Shakespeare. Ironically, Taylor's triumph 
here proves that the left has not lost the culture wars across the board on 
every front, contrary to his sweeping claims in his latest book. 
Cultural Selection represents Taylor's continued bid to establish himself as 
a public intellectual. The new book's greatly expanded historical, geographi-
cal and disciplinary scope raises the ante conSiderably. Amidst the wide-
ranging commentary, Taylor returns frequently enough to his homebase to 
make one feel that he is writing a vast metaphysics of textual editorship 
when he eloquently delineates the contingencies and fragility surrounding 
cultural artefacts. Yet the all-out effort necessary for the difficult feat of carv-
ing out a public niche has left Taylor with insufficient time to reflect on the 
possible complexities, problems and limitations of the role of public intellec-
tual. 
Despite Taylor's style of explanatory decisiveness-his declarative one-
liners hum with pith and zip-there is something curiously fragmented, ten-
tative and incomplete about the overall argument. A case in point is the final 
chapter on Richard Nixon. The focus on Nixon is a logical extension of the 
.-
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theme of the culture wars. Taylor sees Nixon's appeal to traditional values 
as the culture wars' starting-point; Nixon's victory inaugurates the right's 
dominance of the Presidency, the downfall and paralysis of the left. Taylor 
twice remarks on how the assassination of Kennedy, when Taylor was 10 
years old, made it possible to reverse the result of the 1960 election. More-
over, the chapter can also be read as Taylor's intervention in the 1996 presi-
dential election. We are left in no doubt how Taylor feels about Bob Dole's 
identification with Nixon. But Bill Clinton is present only in an epigraph. 
Taylor's silence on Clinton prevents him from addressing the problems on 
cultural policy within the Democratic party and he thus cuts himself off 
from a full consideration of conflicts on the left side of the spectrum. 
A second difficulty is that Taylor'S hyperbole about the left's failure causes 
him to ignore the very large exception of Henry Louis Gates, Jr. Much recent 
discussion of public intellectuals has emphasized black critics, with Gates 
justifiably seen as the leading figure. Gates's media savvy is part of his con-
ceptual brilliance; his mastery of public presentation makes possible a sub-
stantive contribution to national public-policy debates, while his deftness 
makes it unlikely that Gates will be caught in Michael Lerner's unproduc-
tive, predictable bid with the Clintons over the politics of meaning. The ab-
sence of Gates in Cultural Selection is felt not only because he is a relevant 
model for the public intellectual stance to which Taylor aspires but also be-
cause of the topic of race. Throughout Cultural Selection, Taylor alludes tanta-
lizingly but tangentially to racial matters, yet the issue of race never quite 
comes into focus. In one key instance, the issue is disturbingly thwarted 
when Taylor transforms Ellison's Invisible Man into a metaphor for the invisi-
bility of the editor, thus effacing and circumventing the specific racial signifi-
cance of Ellison's work. This is not to deny the validity of interracial 
communication that permits Ellison to speak for Taylor, and Taylor for Elli-
son, but rather to insist that the complicated medium of "lower frequencies" 
that enables such exchanges is not a system of perfect equivalencies in which 
one element can simply substitute for another, without explanation or analy-
sis. 
Gary Taylor has unquestionably succeeded in creating an opening-his 
own evolutionary niche-in the public sphere but Cultural Selection does not 
fully clarify how he will use the opportunity this consolidation of his celeb-
rity affords him. The answer will not be provided by Taylor's current project 
as editor of the Oxford edition of Thomas Middleton. A full answer to the 
question of the direction toward which Cultural Selection is pointing must 
await its sequel. 
Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute Peter Erickson 
Literary Realism and the Ekphrastic Tradition by Mack Smith. University Park: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. Pp. 269. $35.00. 
The question of the nature and even the possibility of representation has 
dominated twentieth-century philosophy and literary theory. In painting and 
• 
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the plastic arts, representation was abandoned early in favor of abstraction, 
which in turn has been called into question. But the novel, because its me-
dium is language, could not as completely divorce itself from representation, 
although in the hands of authors such as Joyce, Beckett, Pynchon, and De-
Lillo it has certainly problematized the relationship between word and 
world. Nonetheless, as Mack Smith says, "a shift in realist paradigms has 
taken place in this century from an empirical, correspondence theory of sig-
nification to a foundational model emphasizing discourse and a coherence 
theory of meaning" (2). Coherence theory holds that meaning is generated 
by the internal order of a semiotic system, regardless of whether that system 
represents or corresponds to an external reality. Rival systems can be coher-
ent while offering opposing or radically differing claims, as with the Pto-
lemaic and Copernican cosmologies. 
The coherence model may not be the recent paradigm shift that Smith 
claims it is, at least within literary theory. Some would say it is present in 
Aristotle's "Poetics," particularly in his distancing of artistic probablity from 
actual possibility, that it is found in Sir Philip Sidney'S insistence that poetry 
delivers a "golden" world, not "brazen" reality, and that the battle against 
correspondence escalates in Oscar Wilde's overt celebration of poetic un-
truth. And to the extent that the trashing of correspondence models is a 
tvventieth-century phenomenon, one should say more than Smith does about 
its appearance in the early Formalists. But, in Smith's defence, he is not writ-
ing the history of a critical idea, he is offering a reading of various novels: 
Don Quixote, Emma, Anna Karenina, Ulysses, and Gravity's Rainbow. 
Smith argues that each of these novels concerns itself with the correspon-
dence-coherence opposition. Each novel embodies by way of textual ek-
phrasis-descriptive passages that refer to the issue of representation-the 
problems involved in the common notion that language can represent a 
realm of truth and facticity. But here a difficulty arises. Smith has claimed 
that the shift to a coherence paradigm is a tvventieth-century phenomenon, 
but half of his book is devoted to finding the correspondence paradigm cri-
tiqued in novels that pre-date our century. He does not explain the paradox, 
although what he seems to mean is that the theoretical articulation of coher-
ence theory is a tvventieth-century phenomenon, but that novelists of the 
past anticipated it, just as many authors can be said to anticipate Freudian 
insights. In any case, Smith wants it both ways-coherence theory was dis-
covered by twentieth- century philosophy, but Cervantes, Austen, and Tol-
stoy knew all about it. 
'What links these three to Joyce and Pynchon, in Smith's view, is a com-
mon (poststructural and postrnodern) suspicion that social codes, language 
and "discourse" fail to penetrate or reveal the real and in fact often merely 
delude. One's judgment of Smith's book will depend in part on how care-
fully nuanced his readings of each novel seem to be. Personally, I did not 
feel greatly enlightened by his discussion of Don Quixote, which does not ad-
equately move beyond the truism that Cervantes exposes the absurdity of 
Quixote's discourse on the real. Quixote's words do not correspond to reality 
-there is no news here. 
The ekphrastic moments in Emma include Emma's drawing of Harriet and 
the word game that Emma and Elton call "charade." Smith's analysis of 
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these textual moments leads to commentary on Emma's mistaken represen-
tation of her social reality. That Emma holds some kinship with Quixote in 
this regard is, again, not a new critical insight. Smith is employing a new 
critical vocabulary to describe what used to be called the appearance VS. 
reality theme. More interesting is Smith's assertion that Austen's text pres-
ents, as an alternative to Emma's representation of the feat a sort of intui-
tionism that anticipates Tolstoy. "The text disguises the source of social truth 
by presenting it more as a priori intuitive realization than as an external 
code" (106), 
The discussion of Anna Karenina moves nicely from an examination of ek-
phrastic moments, such as the descriptions of the paintings of Vronsky and 
Mihailov, to a discussion of Tolstoy'S suspicion of social codes and discours-
es, which (predictably at this point in Smith's study) only delude in their 
pretenses to correspondence. Smith contrasts Tolstoy'S critique of these codes 
with his representation, primarily through Levin, of a nonlinguistic appre-
hension of truth. "Tolstoy'S text ... seeks a more keen discursive correspon-
dence to actuality by exposing the faults of a coherence view 
emphasizing the linguistic structure of reality. The valorized correspondent 
discourse is one that would, if possible, dispense with language entirely" 
(138), Tolstoy is in the melancholy position of needing correspondence while 
recognizing that social codes merely cohere. Despite the fact that each novel 
seems to lead us to the same conclusion, that correspondence is an ever-re-
ceding ideal, Smith has found, by way of ekphrastic moments and the corre-
spondence-coherence opposition, a fresh way of approaching the problem of 
Tolstoy'S cynicism and intuitionism, which ultimately led to his rejection of 
his own fiction. Seemingly, Tolstoy came to recognize the contradiction be-
tween his skepticism concerning language and his actions as novelist. 
At this point, it may sOlllld as though the word "realism" in Smith's title is 
inappropriate, but Smith's position is that "realism is more than just a mode 
by which novels claim fidelity to actuality, It is a tradition in which novelists 
examine dramatically and narratively the central focus of philosophic real-
ism, the relation of word to world" (157). This definition seems to allow real-
ism to include its opposite or other-any fiction that can be read as a critique 
of realism. Some readers may see carelessness here, others will see some-
thing fashionably deconstructive. 
If twentieth-century philosophy has invested heavily in the coherence par-
adigm, and Smith mentions a number of philosophers briefly at the start of 
his chapters on Joyce and Pynchon, one would expect the paradigm to 
emerge even more clearly in our century's fiction. In Ulysses, correspondence 
is denied by means of the multiple narrative styles by which "Joyce ques-
tiems the possibility of objective knowledge separate from our modes of 
discourse" (161). Like Anna Karenina, Ulysses betrays a desire for correspon-
dence, found most persistently in the later novel's musical motifs. In a long 
argument, Smith attempts to show that "the entire musical ekphrasis, ex-
I tending and resonating throughout the text, is a semiotic system that con-
strains the indeterminacy of textual meaning by making the multiple 
intertextual signifiers refer ultimately to a signified representing consubstan-
tiality and thus at least the comforting illusion of correspondence" (176), I 
leave it to others to decide whether the musical ekphrasis really aCCOll-
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plishes this wistful resurrection of the older paradigm that Joyce otherwise 
refutes. 
Because Smith has defined, not uncontroversially, the tradition of realism 
as a tradition that critiques its own possibility, Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow 
is realism's crowning achievement. But realism has become its own opposite 
when Smith says that this novel reveals "postmodern language as an impris-
oning system of internal coherence that has replaced an idealized correspon-
dence with reality/' although, yet again, Gravity's Rainbow reveals "a 
nostalgic longing for this relation" (202). In this novel, Smith's theme can be 
coaxed from an examination of ekphrastic descriptions of songs, myths, and 
artifacts, although the principal ekphrasis is the recurrent allusion to cinema, 
the frames of which "connote better than any other form the 'framing' of 
reality" that semiotic systems are guilty of when one no longer believes that 
they can represent reality objectively (215). 
Did each of these authors really entertain such similarly skeptical and 
cOinCidentally postmodern attitudes toward language and especially toward 
intuition? Or is the signifier so inevitably free-floating as to take on whatever 
illusion of rrteaning each generation of interpreters wishes to impose upon it? 
Is Smith's book an example of the critic finding, in Norman Holland's term, 
his own "identity theme" in the literature under study? I am inclined to opt 
for the latter explanation. Smith's critical persona or identity is entirely post-
modern, and there is a note of triumph in each of his demonstrations that 
one of the great authors of the past was a closet postmodern, as though we 
had witnessed the "outing" of Cervantes and Jane Austen. 
Smith's study, then, raises a question: why is postmodemism so pleased to 
preside over the demise of reason and representation? And why, even as it 
privileges coherence theory over correspondence, does it so glibly rehearse 
formulas that lack coherence, such as the assertion that intuition can replace 
logic, which is merely a tool of oppression? In this postmodern turn from 
reason, science has often become the target, and Smith includes the required 
paragraph denying the objectivity of scientific knowledge, seeing "the his-
tory of science as the succession of conceptual schemes that create more-
workable concepts of nature through which practical scientific and 
epistemological advances may be achieved-the conceptual scheme is mea-
sured not only by the adequacy of its approximations to nature but by the 
theoretical and technological answers that can be formulated by the kind and 
quality of questions it allows" (158). Although this is meant to convey a 
view of scientific discourse as something other than a correspondent dis-
course, the only phrase in Smith's sentence that makes sense (again, Smith 
would have it both ways) is the phrase that allows "approximations to na-
ture." And how, indeed, could science be "workable" if this were not the 
case? 
If it were merely a matter of specialists arguing among themselves about 
novels, the privileging of theories of knowledge that rob us of places from 
which to make judgments and know the truth could seem relatively inno-
cent. But Smith's celebration of intuition and of the denial that our words 
can mean anything in particular is a symptom of a larger assault on reason 
in the humanities, an assault found, for instance, in the claims of some femi-
nists that mathematics is merely a male discourse, or found in the claims of 
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some Afro-centrists that ancient Egyptians had flying machines and knew 
about quantum mechanics. If taken seriously by our students, such irration-
alism could have disastrous consequences, and we should object to it even 
when it limits itself to seeing its own reflection in a handful of novels. 
Loyola University, New Orleans Bruce Henricksen 
__ Gur Vampires, Ourselves by Nina Auerbach. Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1995. Pp. 238. $22.00. 
Nina Auerbach's latest book blends literary analysis of vampire texts with 
a cultural reading of how vampirism infects our thoughts. Our Vampires, 
Ourselves offers a critical, and largely chronological, survey of vampire sto-
ries, beginning with a comparison of Byron's 1816 fragmentary tale introduc-
ing the vampire figure and Polidori's The Vampyre (1819) and ending with 
Kathryn Bigelow's 1987 film Near Dark. Yet it would be a mistake to view 
OUf Vampires, Ourselves as being only a history of vampires in literature, for 
it is at the same time "a history of Anglo-American culture through its mu-
tating vampires" (1). This book is a fascinating and appealing historical 
study that is also a model of engaging cultural criticism. 
Auerbach posits "that v<:t.mpirism springs not only from ~.,!noi~, xeno-
phobia, or immortal rangings, but from generosity and shared enthuSiasm": 
her own excitement concerning the-subject motivates her argument (vii). The 
four textual chapters of Our Vampires, Ourselves are arranged according to a 
loose historical and typological chronology and focus on developing cultural 
paradigms of the vampire. There is a brief and personalized introduction 
that sets out the cultural issues to be analyzed, followed by the first chapter, 
which c?~~iders Romanti~~~.2.I}Y~_~tiq~s regarding marriage and frie:ndship in 
relation to yai"ibus 'hineteenth- and twentieth.:.century fictional, theatrical, and 
film-texts -figuring the vampire as an intimate. 'The seCoTIaChapter 'pivots' 
arouna a" discussion--of-Bram-Sroker'-s-Dfcicullt-comparing that work to F. W. 
Mumau's Nosferatu as a version of the animalistic Dracula. In her third chap-
ter, Auerbach traces the various transmutations of psychic vampirism in fic-
tion contemporary with and following Stoker's novel, including work by 
Stephen King and Anne Rice, and popular films, ranging from Todd Brown-
ing's, starring Bela Lugosi, to the Hammer films with Christopher Lee and 
Peter Cushing. The fourth chapter ambitiously charts out how the promise 
embodied in 1970s vampires gives way to the "depressed creatures" of the 
Reagan years (165). By examining how contemporary vampires are repre-
sented as typically dysfunctional, Auerbach convincingly demonstrates how 
horror stories reproduce and refract cultural tensions. 
Auerbach's first chapter lays the groundwork for her argument by deline-
ating the relationship between Byron and Polidori and analyzing the male 
friendships depicted in their relevant works as vampirism of the homoerotic 
kind. She goes on to describe the less-known theatrical adaptation of Poli-
dori's story by l R. Planche and considers how the technology of the ghost 
trap, "q pair of spring-controlled doors cut into the scenery," encouraged 
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audiences to perceive vampires as disembodied spirits (23). Another signifi-
cant innovation introduced by Planche concerns his emphasis on the vam-
pire's dependence on and association with the moon. Noting how cinematic 
treatments of monsters (vampires, wolfmen) make much of the moon, Auer-
bach contrasts the Shakespearean vision of the moon as it "licenses en-
chanted eroticism" (A Midsummer Night's Dream) with the mid-Victorian idea 
that the "moon is the magic fusion among species, the balm that joins hu-
man to preterhuman, death to life" (25-26). Auerbach then shifts her discus-
sion to the popular serial Varney the Vampire, whose author is presumed to 
be James Malcolm Rymer. Many of Varney's characteristics (that he is preter-
natural yet bound by human relationships, that he can transform victims 
into his own kind, that he is "an increasingly representative interloper in a 
predatory society") also surface in Stoker's novel and other versions of Dra-
cula (29). Auerbach takes care to demonstrate Varney's similarities to other 
social predators in literature, such as Thackeray's Becky Sharp (of Vanity 
Fair) and Sweeney Todd (of George Dibdin Pitt's The String of Pearls; or, The 
Fiend of Fleet Street and the Stephen Sondheim and Hugh Wheeler 1979 
Broadway musical), as well as Alan Raby, the title character of Dion Bouci-
caull's drama, The Vampire (1852). 
Turning fron1 male relationships and identity formation, Auerbach con-
cludes her first chapter by exploring the connections among Sheridan Le 
Fanu's Carmilla (1872), Coleridge's Christa bel, and film adaptations of the sto-
ry, notably The Hunger (1983: directed by Tony Scott and based on Whitley 
Strieber's novel). She carefully documents the transformation of the female 
vampiric relationship from fiction to film in claiming that "Carmilla is one of 
the few self-accepting homosexuals in Victorian or any literature" and that 
"homosexuality itself is figured as female" (41). Auerbach describes Carmil-
la's erotic aUaclunent to Laura as Le Fanu represents it and contrasts this 
female model of vampirism with the male examples previously discussed, 
noting of Carmilla that II as a woman, the vampiric friend releases a bound-
less capacity for intimacy" (45). Carmilla's "vampirism ... is an interchange, 
a sharing, an identification, that breaks down the boundaries of familial roles 
and the sanctioned hierarchy of marriage" (47). In contrast, tvventieth-cen-
hlry cinematic treatments of female vampirism "repudiate the lintimacy, or 
friendship' of their sentimental predecessors" (60). 
Bram Stoker's Dracula continues the journey frOlTI intimacy to self-con-
sciousness by insisting on his right of possession according to the hierarchy 
depicted in the novel, as the words "belongs to me" resonate (71). As Auer-
bach remarks, Dracula is "harbinger of a world to come, a world that is our 
own" (63). As one who "identifies only with a vanished conquering race 
whose token is not a mortal but an animal/' Dracula "reshapes" himself 
lIinto his unrecognizable likeness/' more like Keats' Lamia than Coleridge's 
Geraldine (64). Auerbach gracefully demonsh'ates the transformations of Sto-
ker's Dracula in various film treahnents of the Dracula subject, noting that 
"Murnau's Nosferatu and Browning's Dracula struggle to reunite the vampire 
to his mortal friend .... Both movies finally succumb to the coldness at the 
heart of Stoker's novel, the requiem of a tradition of intimacy" (78). Dracula 
is an isolated figure, who is unable to bond in the way of other male charac-
ters in the novel; he does not appear to infect other men with his vampirism 
I. 
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but makes pawns of infected women. Auerbach connects this vampire figure 
to Oscar Wilde in the dock, by citing Richard Dellamora's argument in Mas-
culine Desire that legal restrictions regarding sexuality in the late nineteenth 
century changed If emphasis from sexual acts between menf especially sodo-
my, the traditional focus of legislation, to sexual sentiment or thought and 
in this way to an abstract entity soon to be widely referred to as 
'homosexuality'" (84). Auerbach asserts that modern film treatments of Dra-
cula's erotic relationships with the female characters, Lucy and Mina, are of-
ten distortions of Stoker's emphasis on male homoeroticism. 
The psychic vampires described in chapter three, characters in lesser 
known works like Alice and Claude Askew's "Aylmer Vance and the Vam-
pire" (1914), George Sylvester Viereck's The House of the Vampire (1907), Fritz 
Leiber's "The Girl with the Hungry Eyes" (1949), Arthur Conan Doyle's "The 
Parasite" (1894), and Mary E. Wilkins Freeman's "Luella Miller" (1903) "lurk 
at the sophisticated center of adult society" (102). According to the cultural 
values of author and audience, psychic vampires are more or less powerfully 
masculine, perverse, marginal, and/or parasitically feminine. As Auerbach 
notes, the Doyle and Freeman stories inextricably link psychic vampirism to 
"womanly dependence," to the old maid and the helpless wife (107). Homo-
sexual and female vampires of this type are more interested in soul stealing 
I than in bloodsucking. Without souls of their own, they hunger after others'. 
The common characteristic of psychic vampires is that they "thrive on revul-
sion/' in violating common standards and revealing "the predatory tmder-
side of inspirational idealism" (109), for, as Auerbach so nicely puts it, "They 
refuse blood but they grow fat on human friendship" (109). 
In the second part of her argument concerning psychic vampires, Auer-
I bach discusses more recent fictions that reproduce and revise the Dracula 
I tradition of "feeding" as alluring aesthetic representations. Moving from 
I analysis of Bela Lugosi's foreign appeal to a consideration of other 
"captivating" monsters-Boris Karloff as Frankenstein's creature and King 
Kong, Auerbach demonstrates how they represent" '30s hopes and fears" of 
being foreign, formal, abnormal, and speechless (117). The 1960s Hammer 
films of Dracula, while promoting the powers of the sun to enervate vam-
pires, admiringly represent the material advantages of vampires and rebel-
liously offer images of domesticity and womanhood under seige. Just as the 
Dracula myth presents new possibilities for the culture, historical events and 
discoveries provide the opporttmity to reinterpret the myth: Raymond Mc-
Nally and Radu Forescu's In search of Dracula (1972) linked the mythic vam-
pire to the historical figure of Vlad Tepes, patriot and leader. The remainder 
of the third chapter analyzes how the revisionist history of Dracula inspires 
recent American film adaptations, notably Bram Stoker's Dracula (1973 TV 
film starring Jack Palance), Dark Shadows (1966-71 TV series), and John Bad-
ham's Dracula (1979 starring Frank Langella). It is the fictions, usually those 
by women, that reexamine how vampirism promotes cultural interpretation 
and transformation; Auerbach looks at works by Chelsea Quinn Yarbro, 
Suzy McKee Charnas, Anne Rice, Stephen King, and Tanith Lee in consider-
ing how their protagonists reconfigure vampirism under specific historical 
conditions. 
The fourth chapter of Our Vampires, Ourselves ambitiously weaves together 
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socioeconomic and political analysis of the Reagan years with textual expli-
cation of Hollyvvood vampire movies and popular fiction of this period and 
later. Auerbach regards Love at First Bite (1979) as "an authentic comic ro-
mance about vampires," while Vampire's Kiss (1989) and The Lost BOljs (1987) 
reproduce 19805 tensions by acknowledging individual and social paralysis 
and the inevitability of resisting oppression. Brian Stableford's The Empire of 
feor (1988), Kim Newman's AllIlO DraCllla (1992), Anne Rice's Vampire Chroni-
cles, Brian Aldiss's Dracula Ullbol//1(i (1991), and other fictions are invoked as 
<1ttempts to explore "vampire inertia" (170), gender identity, and political 
discontent in the age of AIDS. 
TI1C last part of the chapter, and the book, build to a provocative argument 
as Auerbach reinserts her personal experience into the narrative by relating 
her observation of two particular presentations at a 1993 Irvine conference on 
Quecr Theory. Sandy Stone's and Sue-Ellen Case's incantatory performances 
represent problematic rlttempts to embody vampires and to reconstruct dis-
courses of identity and body. Auerbach theorizes that "when reaction and 
AIDS seemed to petrify the future, critics longed for impermanence: Queer 
Theorists apotheosized a phantasmal, unsettled spirit. Even the countercul-
tur,l\ v<1mpire is 8 product, if a resistant one, of its age" (184). After a brief 
discussion of the role of Queer Theory in Jewelle Gomez's account of a black 
lesbian vampire in The Gilda Stories (1993), an account that allows for "the re-
covcry of viJmpire homoeroticism" (186), Auerbach concludes her argument 
with <1n analysis of Kathryn Bigelow's Near Dark, a vampire film that takes a 
parodic look at macho violence in a Southwestern setting, although it ends 
on iJ patriarchically comfortable and sentimentally conservative note when 
the infected protagonist is successfully transfused, and therefore purified, by 
hi~ \'ctcrinari,m f<1ther. Auerbach is typically sensitive to the mixed messages 
convcyed: "If viJmpirism is a \\'asting disease like AIDS, its cure is a bless-
ing, but if it conta.ins immorta.lity, secret strength, and forbidden identities, 
its domcsticJtion is a death more painful than Homer's," the child vampire 
\\'ho crie.:; out for wh<1t he can't hove as he shrivels and burns (192) . 
... \ rccent Nctt' Yorker C<1rtoon (June 17, 1996) depicts two aging, well-
dressed men with fangs and capcs in convcrsation; one man says to the oth-
L't', "Look, wc're three thousand years old. No one's going to hire us." What 
till' c,lrtonnist Bruce Eric Kaplan acknowledges is that v<1mpires, like many 
lltlll'rs in .m economy dominated by downsizing, have no future on the job 
l1l.HkL't. :\llcrb.lCh's penultimate sentence indicates th<lt "vampirism is wcar-
ill~~ dUWll ,1Jld \',Hnpircs need <1 long restorati\'l' slcep" (192). Yet thc transfor-
m,llit)!) (If \·.lrnpiri~m docs not neccssiJrilv meiJn the cxh<1ustion of horror 
!lctil)]l ,mel film, which ZlppCiJr to be thri~'ing in <l culture ripe for iJmu:.c-
!Ill'n! 
C<1roi Cobtrclb 
I;!:, f :~"',1I11 } bl()II! (,I ,/ ~:d:t' ()t' ;\lilld b\ !\ltrici.l r.kyL'r Spilcb. Chi-
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We are always and irrevocably, it seems, in the era of the causal claim; the 
allure of the neat, sequential logic of cause-and-effect always beckons. In a 
world of semiotic fractures, literary expression is about its rhetoricity; in a 
world constituted by historical exigencies, the text is about its implicated 
status as context. But these predicated interpretations usually occur as a 
function of a linear sequence: as in much psychoanalytic performance, for 
example, causal origin is deduced from thematic connection, so that (to bor-
row a phrase from Frank Kermode's The Sense of an Ending), we who exist 
"in the middest" may know ourselves and our cultural needs in the terms of 
a coherent narrative. Structure-even narratives of structure's dislocation-is 
all. Structure holds our attention, and explanation is what we all grasp after. 
And for Patricia Meyer Spacks, the stimulation inherent in cultural expres-
sion is the effect of the boredom dynamic's cause. This explanatory narra-
tive, then, will keep us wide awake into the long night of book reviewing. 
Boredom: The Literary History of a State of Mind brilliantly opens up a space 
in which to assess the critical phenomenon of descriptive narrative, even as 
it treads ever so uneasily on its ground; that is, Boredom offers a compelling 
reading not just of psychic alienation through the ages, but of its explanatory 
force. And any motif that explains, that carries predictive power, must be 
approached with the greatest caution. Fortunately, Spacks's pleasure in her 
I subject's ubiquity sacrifices very little to the facile even as it reveals the 
trademark sign of its subject's menace. That is, in organizing a reading of 
western culture since the eighteenth century around a negative reflex (the 
need to counter dullness), it constructs a master narrative, a supremely fasci-
nating insistence that its subject is so inclusive, it must be deeply implicated 
in all cultural movement. The force of her narrative sequence must hold our 
attention: what could be more urgent than the ghost that haunts our every 
I utterance, our every reading endeavour, our every effort to pay attention. Of 
I course nothing could be more urgent because such a rubric subsumes every-
thing, which is as much to say that the causal history of boredom is here 
posited as history. "All 'cultural advance' derives from the need to with-
stand boredom; literature is a single instance among many" (3). That is a tall 
claim. 
But then again, there is none among us who cannot claim to be exempt 
from its force, and herein lies Spacks's marvellous resonance. Boredom raises 
I a frightening spectre because "readers' capacity to declare themselves unin-
volved threatens the writer's project as it menaces their own pleasure. All lit-
erary endeavour occurs in a context of conceivable rejection" (2). One can 
live with disagreement even with fiery opposition; but to recognize oneself 
as boring is to have one's very existence effectively nullified, cancelled, not 
worth even the energy of conscious rejection. The quest not to bore, then, be-
comes a quest for survival, but only of a sort. If I have ceased to exist for 
you because my narratives put you to sleep, then I will find a place in which 
I can exist, I will leave, but only to resurface in another space, or maybe only 
in another form. Here, the reader nullifies the writer by declaring her too 
dull; but then the writer threatens the intellectual and imaginative integrity 
of the reader. With such dynamics in mind, Spacks traces an early nine-
teenth-century sensibility through Wordsworth's efforts to educate the pub-
lic. Like many of his poetic peers, Wordsworth sought to make his readers 
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pay attention to the wonderments precisely of the everyday and of the mar-
ginal. In rejecting the sensation literature of his time and in writing the Lyri-
cal Ballads in a form of studied pedestrianism, "what is important is, or 
should be, interesting, Wordsworth implicity argues, and conversely, what is 
interesting should be important" (114). In this, the poet was turning to an 
older meaning of the word "interest," one that equated the interesting with 
the important. And where Spacks finds hints and glimmers of doubt in 
Wordsworth's self-assurance, she is able to trace the emergence of a world in 
which communal values can no longer be confidently posited. All the same, 
in the Wordsworthian understanding here described, the responsibility to 
read well is the responsibility to be fully human: "Failure to respond to his 
text may imply human failure to respond to the needs and natures of others 
perceived as unlike the self" (115). My disappearance, then, can only mean 
your death to me. You are not an interesting listener if you can't stay awake. 
Finding me boring attests to your inferior reading skills. 
Indeed, the very history of boredom-which in this narrative, is also the 
history of cultural advance since the eighteenth century-hinges upon the 
development of constructions of selfhood and the development of notions of 
subjectivity. Spacks deftly traces the ways in which the sexes "use" boredom 
for and within different ends. For eighteenth-century women novelists, "to 
constitute fiercely imposed misery as boredom's only alternative implies de-
vious but intelligible social protest. The taken-for-granted probability of 
boredom in a woman's life provides the starting point for narrative-and 
perhaps for female anger" (62). In both the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, to be bored is to fail an essential test of human worth. By the nineteenth 
century, however, its meaning-especially for women-has somewhat 
changed. In a virtuosic reading of Maria Edgeworth's Helen (1834), Spacks 
observes that the characters portrayed as bored "fail not in thought but in 
feeling. Feeling attests character. The good woman's primary interest in 
other people demonstrates appropriate emotional orientation" (181). And 
then thinking of the implicit stance of muted protest in characters portrayed 
in Austen, Edgeworth and Charlotte Bronte, she concludes that "what they 
resist is the social prohibition for women of many forms of meaningful 
action. The struggle against boredom is one consequence of such prohibi-
tion .... Misguided or conventional in form, their resistance helps constitute 
their characters and the plots that contain them" (189). 
Before the eighteenth century individuals got bored or were repulsed by 
tedium, to be sure; however, such responses were theorized in the terms of 
apathy, and more importantly, in the terms of a spiritual malaise that threat-
ened the personal responsibility of the disengaged creature. Personal respon-
Sibility remains a vital motif into the eighteenth century, but it speaks to a 
differently inflected understanding of experience. It is a concentration on 
such inflections that focuses Spacks's historical narrativizing. For the eigh-
teenth-century organization of the work force, and its concomitant increase 
in "leisure time," exposed a separation of work and leisure that humankind 
simply had not known before. Furthermore, with the decline of orthodox 
Christianity as the central ethic of society, individual rights, especially the 
right to pursue happiness as an individual, becomes paramount. The rise of 
individualism, according to Spacks's careful calibrations, coincides with the 
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consciousness-and therefore with the cultural history-of the threat of bore-
dom. 
Spacks's tone in this book, though often witty and certainly engaged (en-
gagement, of course, being the very opposite of boredom) is not hysterical; 
she is interested in a social history that reveals as much about our changing 
conceptions of the social as it does about the recording of history. She does 
not take us through an overview of the existential agonies of expression or 
the crises of reception: fear of dullness is no Bloomean angst or submerged 
and displaced political manoeuvre. Instead, it is an all pervasive scaffolding 
on which hang the structural materials of modernity. 
Spacks is a subtle reader, and so her historical narrative does not merely 
reduce culture to a progressive terror of inattentiveness. We must be clear 
about this, as such projects as hers are vulnerable to misrepresentation. For 
the most part, she bears this vulnerability well. As both cultural construct 
and cultural by-product, boredom's history raises urgent questions about 
our own historicity: as the author is at pains to point out, the social history 
of boredom is a history of how taste is constituted, of how importance and 
significance are deSignated, and of how ultilnate value (as shifting a concept 
as that is) is articulated in the very announcement of what interests. If the 
eighteenth-century individual saw boredom as an ethical and moral flaw, 
one that must be remedied for the sake of the salvation of the individual 
soul as much as for its postulated community, then something crucially im-
portant is revealed about the status of shared values and communal norms. 
The postmodern condition of boredom, on the other hand, is in fact the ap-
test metaphor of our own age. In Spacks's reading, "Boredom as universal 
explanation and complaint reveals the scope of tvventieth-century entitle-
ment: Calvin's sense of a right to adventures, the teenager's right to 'be with 
friends every single minute,' the housewife's right to mental stimulation" 
(260). 
We have a right to stimulation: this, at least, we know. For in an age of 
discontinuities and generalized uncertainty, one marked by "the end of his-
tory," the history we know ourselves to be sharing seems to be one in which 
we are bored but do not want to be. Hence the proliferation of critical and 
historical narratives of strange excitement, of academic books announcing an 
ultimate substratum of powerful force repressed beneath the fabric of quo-
tidian complacency. We may be staid, repetitive, monotonous. We may pro-
duce too many books that tell our new secrets to ourselves. But our 
monotony is only the obverse of our sublimated Dionysian frenzy. Psycho-
I analysis, Romanticism's great gift to modernity, tells a story in which bore-
dom masks aggression, in which it tells of a state of "instinctual tension" 
seeking an endlessly deferred release. Our very boredom (so the story goes) 
is thereby a subject that explains our deep selves, and our deep selves are of 
course very interesting. 
Boredom as an organizing motif around which the development of mod-
ern culture can be studied is therefore compelling. Everyone should read this 
book, not least because it could not possibly bore. But as surely as boredom 
and its resistance can organize a cultural reading, so can desire. Likewise 
with belief, subjectivity, will to power, and more insistently these days, poli-
tics. This is not to suggest that Spacks is unaware of the responsiveness of 
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her boredom project to any of these issues. Still, it will be worthwhile to bear 
in mind that she has chosen boredom as a heuristic, and that her explana-
tions sometimes work better as descriptions. This is not to cancel the effec-
tiveness of those descriptions in providing a glimpse of humanity's 
development; it is only to caution that when description is converted into 
explanation, something more than just cultural history is going on. Cultural 
history, that is, is being constituted in the effort to define self-expression as a 
profoundly publiC fact. The particular history here given speaks to our pres-
ent preoccupation with the status of communal norms, and the way in which 
their complexities may be made coherent-and therefore interesting-by be-
coming part of a sequential narrative. Boredom is a very welcome contribu-
tion to the community (academic) that labours alone and longs to speak to 
something other than the void. We are all, then, in Spacks's debt: our most 
private meditations respond, however subtly, to a collective ethic of human 
rapport, one in which to speak and to hear are continuous with the quest to 
engage in the highest endeavours of the creation of meaning. 
University of Toronto Karen A. Weisman 
Paper Bullets: Print and Kingship under Charles II by Harold M. Weber. Lexing-
ton: University of Kentucky Press, 1996. Pp. 302. $39.95. 
Anticipating Michael McKeon's recent call to "historicize patriarchy," Har-
old Weber's Paper Bullets addresses two abiding disciplinary interests among 
scholars of the "long" eighteenth century: the emergence of print culture and 
the gendering of political authority. Only with the combined pressure of new 
historicism and cultural studies, though, has the field come to see these two 
interests as intimately imbricated. And it is to this newly recognized in-
tersection that Paper Bullets seeks to speak. Weber contends, here, that "The 
transformation of the English monarchy during the seventeenth century was 
not simply played out against a backdrop of changes in the production, mar-
keting, and consumption of printed matter, but was itself part of these 
changes" (5). In support of his contention, Weber offers his readers a com-
manding array of archival evidence including proclamations, statutes, pam-
phlets and trial transcripts, which compellingly document the crown's active 
manipulation of the Restoration press as vehicle for its own power. And for 
scholars of the period wishing to deepen their understanding of this particu-
lar aspect of Restoration political culture Paper Bullets holds much of interest. 
Weber's project proceeds through five chapters conceptually organized 
around the book's two themes: "Representations of the King" and "The Lan-
guage of Censorship," with the later section offering some of the most inter-
esting evidence of Weber's central argument, particularly in terms of the 
crown's creation of authorship as a legal fiction through which it could more 
effectively control seditious print. But Paper Bullets also labors under concep-
tual inconsistencies and a kind of historical inattention that often makes its 
central argument dubious and the final two chapters' incisive payoff too 
long in coming. 
-, 
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Paper Bullets begins by meticulously and promisingly laying the ground-
work for its investigation, deftly noting that "The implementation of the Res-
toration settlement inevitably revealed the unresolved tensions that had 
divided the nation during its mid-century upheavals, and created new con-
flicts as well" (14). Sadly, it does not fulfill its promise to give readers a 
more subtle and attentive account of Restoration political culture's internal 
tensions, nor does it clearly articulate the conceptual relationship between 
Stuart patriarchalism and emergent capitalism. 
Paper Bullets' first section amplifies the disciplinary commonplace that 
Charles II's Restoration carried with it the full reinstatement of Stuart pa-
triarchalism by adding to the familiar catalogue of high cultural representa-
tions an extensive repertoire of popular culture representations. But to a 
large degree this ground has already been covered by Tim Harris' meticu-
lous work on London crowd culture. Moreover, Weber's approach to this 
particular facet of Restoration life lacks Harris' deft attention to complicating 
matters of party and class. Regrettably, Weber drops his analysis of the 
crown's relationship to the populace, which was for this reader one of the 
most enticing promises Paper Bullets makes in its introduction, in favor of 
heavily formalist analyses of escape narratives. For despite the often meticu-
lous readings of this popular subgenre and his salient recognition that these 
tales of Charles II's delivery were clearly deployed as Royalist propaganda, 
Weber's formalist hermeneutic leads him to collapse important historical dis-
tinctions. Thus, for instance, we find no distinction made behveen A Chroni-
cle of the Kings of England published in 1670 after the London fire and two 
Dutch wars, when public sentiment was beginning to be disgruntled with 
crown military and economic policy and had become more cohesive in its 
anti-Catholicism, and earlier versions of the escape narratives published dur-
ing the Restoration's first blush. Although there may have been little formal 
difference between these narratives, they were almost certainly deployed to 
different effecl. 
Readers will find the second and third chapters vexed by similar concep-
tual inconsistencies. Focusing on the monarch's sacred and profane bodies, 
Paper Bullets' topic seems to slip away from Weber here in two chapters that 
should be pivotal to his argument and that take up material both relevant to 
the period and provocatively indicative of the way Restoration culture con-
ceptualized monarchical power. In the first of these chapters Weber dis-
cusses the crown's strategic employment of the royal touch to heal scrofula 
and argues that almost as soon as printing gained currency it instrumentally 
expanded the public theater in which these rituals took place by codifying 
and disseminating representations of the crown's miraculous and divine 
power. The problem is that this ritual, though used by Charles II, was on the 
wane and, according to Weber, by the early eighteenth-century was regu-
larly subjected to medical skepticism. Weber's central contention, here, that 
print "contributed to [royal healing's] assumption of a standard, durable, 
and invariable shape" (56), falls apart and looks like an anachronistic charac-
terization since if permanence is an irreducible conceptual characteristic of 
print culture, we should expect those public rituals in whose permanence 
print was instrumental to be on the ascendancy in the same way that print 
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culture itself was during this period. Clearly, the King's body did not un-
dergo such a transformation. 
But perhaps the most disappointing chapter in Paper Bullets is the third, in 
which Weber discusses print culture's role in undercutting the crown's claim 
to divine right and patrilineal succession by proliferating pornographic rep-
resentations of Charles II. Ostensibly, "The Monarch's Profane Body" prom-
ises to investigate the prevailing constructions of masculinity and the often 
subtle versions of sexual potency that underwrote patriarchalism. Weber 
notes a good portion of the historical work done on early modern sodomiti-
cal culture by Randolph Trumbach and others, but that work remains trou-
blingly unintegrated (relegated to a note) and fails to include Stephen 
Zwicker's important work on Restoration patriarchalism in Lines of Authority. 
Most troublingly, this chapter anachronistically conflates sodomitical culture 
with homosexual masculinity. But beyond the historical inconsistencies, 
"The Monarch's Profane Body" doesn't do what it is poised so well to do 
brilliantly, namely bring the recent insights of gender theory to bear on Res-
toration political configurations of Stuart patriarchalism. 
Paper Bullets' second section constitutes a marked departure from its first 
section. Here we see the impressive erudition and trenchant historical insight 
which the book's first section seemed to promise but failed to deliver, but 
which its author is eminently capable of supplying. Weber's overall argu-
ment would have been considerably more accessible and more convincing 
had he chosen to start his project with the fourth chapter which so lucidly 
exposes the triple intersection between gender, political power and print cul-
ture. At last turning to consider the press' polemical role in its own censor-
ship, Weber elucidates the Stationers Company's transmogrifying 
relationship to Restoration law. Although "The Feminine Part of Every Re-
bellion" often blurs lines between legal authorities implying, for instance, 
that a 1680 judicial decision reaffirming the King's right to "prohibit all unli-
censed newsbooks and pamphlets" (151) manifested crown authoritarianism, 
when in fact the appeal to "civil order" dearly invokes the constitutive prin-
ciple of common law. Here I was disappointed only because a subtler touch 
would have allowed Weber to draw out the provocative insight that by the 
1680's crown authority actively manipulated common law to bolster its be-
sieged political authority, while in the first years of the Restoration Royalist 
propagandists habitually repudiated common law as the legal foundation of 
Parliamentarianism. 
Weber's concluding chapter brings Paper Bullets into focus by investigating 
Stephen College's treason trial in Oxford. Providing a valuable perspective 
on print culture's complex relationship to political authority, Weber wisely 
emphasizes two points too seldom missing from other investigations of this 
problematic: print culture was not limited to London, and at this early junc-
ture in its development the political stakes of print's cultural commentary 
were often fatally high for printers, publishers, and authors alike. 
With sensitivity to its conceptual inconsistencies, Paper Bullets is on the 
whole, I think, a book worth reading for its historical work. Weber marshals 
an impressive array of primary materials in support of his investigation and 
in the book's concluding section those materials are sharply and incisively 
focused. Paper Bullets' major liability is the weakness of its conceptual frame, 
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which only comes into focus during the last two chapters, hampering its in-
vestigation of Restoration kingship and detracting somewhat from the mas-
sive historical work of the first section. Weber's argument here will and 
should provoke further conversation and increased attention to a vitally im-
portant conceptual constellation in early modern political culture. 
University of Delaware Melissa Mowry 
The Pleasures of Virtue: Political Thought in the Novels of Jane Austen by Anne 
Crippen Ruderman. Lanham, MO: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. Pp. ix + 202. 
$21.95 paper, $57.50 cloth. 
At this time when Jane Austen's stock is up, way up, Anne Crippen Rud-
erman's The Pleasures of Virtue reminds us why Austen's novels continue to 
please both close readers and viewing audiences of film adaptations. Austen 
repeatedly identifies, explains, and illustrates the pleasures of virtue through 
consideration of heroes and heroines who find noble thoughts and activities 
pleasant. First among these noble things is attachment to othersf lovef the 
tip-top of Keatsfs Ifpleasure thermometerU in Endymiol1f culminating in mar-
riage in Austen's novels. But love is not all that constitutes happiness, for 
happiness naturally ensues for the morally virtuous, not as an inevitable re-
ward but as an accident of the way Jane Austen's world works. 
The old arguments of self versus society or self-interest versus community 
building that have encouraged recent critics to factor Kant into Austen's 
framework are put to rest while Aristotle's classical moderation becomes the 
ideal: "Austen, like Aristotle, implies that the pleasures of self-control are 
the truest pleasures" (8). Ruderman repeatedly recognizes that we have no 
evidence that Austen read Aristotle or his commentators, though, deep in 
the heart of her argument, she admits parenthetically that "It is tempting to 
say that Austen looks at the world in the way Aristotle does but from the 
perspective of a woman" (143). The specific virtues, suggested by Aristotle 
and fictionally illuminated by Austen, are prudence, sensibility, justice, 
proper pride, modesty, and moderation, the last being the key to Aristotle's 
definition of moral virtue: /I A mean that lies between two vicesf one of ex-
cess and the other of deficiency . the mean is the most praiseworthy 
state." Through moderation of deep feeling by self-command, Jane Austen 
defends the enduring possibility of a human life that both benefits others 
and perfects oneself. Somewhat surprisingly, Ruderman notes that happiness 
is not dependent on marriage but on living a measured life of virtue ac-
quired by habit; marriage follows naturally from a love that is salutary for 
society as well as for individuals because it is grounded on the virtue aimed 
at by both. 
Ruderman provides a credible and creditable corrective not only to the 
new historicist approach that aims to locate in Austen's novels more politics 
than propriety but also to the feminist approach that converts relationships 
into gendered power plays. But because she is alert to both approaches, Rud-
erman controls her own argument by finding the precise mean between 
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these extreme views. Pitting Aristotle against Kant and Wollstonecraft 
against Rousseau, Ruderman reasserts a balance that has been lost in the 
rush of current arguments about Jane Austen as historian or as feminist or 
even, in the flap over Terry Castle's London Review of Books review of Deirdre 
Le Fay's edition of Jane Austen's Letters, as lesbian. jane Austen remains in 
Ruderman's good judgment a novelist and a moralist, whose heroes and her-
oines acquire happiness because they have and continue to cultivate moral 
virtue. 
This is no book for janeites, those who love jane Austen more than they 
understand her. Each of the four long chapters considers all of the novels, 
almost at once, so that occasionally the sensibilities of one capture the sense 
of another: "Frank [Churchill in Emma] might be asked the same question 
that Elinor Dashwood asks Lucy Steele in Sense and Sensibility after hearing 
of her engagement to Edward: has she any plan for marriage 'but that of 
waiting for Mrs. Ferrars' death, which is a melancholy and shocking 
extremity'" (55 148). Frank Churchill knows no Mrs. Ferrars, of course, and a 
paraphrase of the point might serve better than does the quotation. When 
arguing for firmness of principle in heroines, Ruderman appropriates with-
out credit Edmund's definition of FaIU1Y Price, who is "firm as a rock in her 
own principles" (MP 351), as though equal to jane Bennet who is, by the nar-
rator's definition, "firm when she felt herself to be right" (P&P 59). But de-
spite the copious quotation from the novels, Ruderman never loses sight of 
her own argument on the pleasures of virtue. 
She proceeds systematically through education in virtue, where the focus 
is principally on Emma and Northanger Abbey to consideration of particular 
virtues. As she proceeds, she reconsiders why Mr. Knightley and Emma 
Woodhouse are a more suitable match than are Frank Churchill and jane 
Fairfax, and why Emma does not choose jane as her particular friend. The 
gallant Frank and elegant jane have "a kind of selfishness that keeps them 
from being the true hero and heroine of the novel" (28). Emma's openness is 
preferred to jane's reserve, Mr. Knightley's frankness and sensitivity to 
Frank's mysterious secretiveness. To be hero or heroine each must have 
taste, and taste is, in Austen's reckoning, what Austen often calls delicacy, 
"an ability to take pleasure in principled behavior" (37). The best characters 
take pleasure in the very act of reSisting or overcoming their feelings, and 
the best characters always rise to be heroes and heroines. 
Being hospitable, friendly, courteous, urbane, and open requires taste, and 
Henry and Eleanor Tilney demonstrate impeccable taste in contrast to the 
self-aggrandizing Thorpes. But the Thorpes are not villains so much as not 
virtuous. john Thorpe is unscrupulous, and Isabella is dangerously flirta-
tious; neither is worth Catherine Morland's friendship, even before she 
learns to think for herself. Unworthy of happiness, of lasting attachment, of 
love, the Thorpes lack sufficient virtue, and concern for virtue is the root of 
the capacity to love (49). 
Love is based on friendship and friendship is, according to Aristotle and 
Austen alike, based on virtue rather than on pleasure or utility. Emma and 
Mr. Knightley, like Catherine and Henry Tilney, will stay together because 
they see virtues in each other. Marriage follows naturally when choosing a 
supportive friend for a life of continued perfection of virtues. Marriage 
""" 
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brings less duty than mutual growth. Self-sufficiency gives way to love, and 
love results in happiness. Emma and Mr. Knightley feel something "so like 
perfect happiness, that it could bear no other name" (E 432). 
Blake says that "Prudence is a rich old maid courted by incapacity," but to 
Aristotle, a prudent man can" deliberate well concerning what is good and 
expedient for himself, not with respect to a part ... but for living well in 
general" (76). A prudent woman of Austen's definition requires considerably 
more complex elucidation. Ruderman links Anne Elliot of Persuasion, Fanny 
Price of Mansfield Park, and Elinor Dashwood of Sense and Sensibility, all of 
whom have strong sensibilities, keen self-awareness, and old-fashioned 
prudence. All three lose their childhood homes and must move on amid 
family and acquaintances who do not wholly understand them. All succeed 
because all have a respect for propriety, an aspect of prudence, and because 
all have deference and discretion consistent with good taste and fine judg-
ment. Just because a pattern or practice is conventional does not make it 
right, but often "respect for convention is more reasonable than defiance of it" 
(emphasis Ruderman's, 69). Elinor has more freedom of thought than Mar-
ianne; her self-control is greater than her self-indulgence. Elinor's self-con-
trol, "far from being lack of feeling, increases with her feeling" (emphasis 
Ruderman's 71). All of Austen's work argues that the "exercise of reason and 
virtue [is] a fulfillment of human nature, not a pruning of it" (emphasis Rud-
erman's 71). The added emphases in these sentences may shout the argu-
ment Ruderman wishes to make, but her point is ably made without the 
shouting. 
Good marriages in Austen's novels are not based on money or security, 
and true love is not based solely on sexual attraction. Marianne Dashwood's 
often criticized marriage to Colonel Brandon is a match of the "same kind of 
romantic sensibility" (emphasis Ruderman's 79) that characterizes the match 
of Louisa Musgrove and Captain Benwick; both couples are grateful for 
being loved by someone else and both couples find happiness in marriages 
that show that "imprudence leads to a greater dependence on such conven-
tions [as marriage] than does prudence" (79) .. 
Analysis of one virtue does not excuse Ruderman from reconsidering fa-
miliar arguments about the possible lack of virtue or success of characteriza-
tion. Fanny Price, passive and priggish to some readers, provides Rudennan 
a perfect opportunity for rereading character. Fanny marries Edmund Ber-
tram for love and for virtue which each facilitates and encourages in the 
other. Fanny's childlike innocence coupled with a tough spirit that makes 
her constant in her longing for virtue for herself and others more than com-
pensates for her passivity and inwardness. She has both a desire for and a 
vision of virtue that earns her heroine status and final happiness. Yet she is 
neither smug nor self-righteous. Deftly and carefully leaving unsaid that it is 
wicked to marry one person while loving another, Fanny typifies moderation 
in her speech, behavior, and even in her gratitude for Edmund's eventual 
proposal. 
Fanny and Edmund, cousins and nearly siblings in late childhood and ad-
olescence, raise the spectre of sibling love rivalling that of conjugal love. 
Ruderman enters this battle eagerly, seeing the issue first from the perspec-
tive of women's friendship and then of sisters, one for another, and finally of 
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sister for brother. She moderates betvveen the extremes with as deft a control 
as Austen herself, lodging in explanatory footnotes her awareness of all the 
arguments that have bent the texts to accommodate ideological readings, 
misprisions, and exaggerated claims. 
Whether or not Austen knew Aristotle's various dicta on virtue, Rous-
seau's on education, or Wollstonecraft's on the rights of women, she illus-
trates again and again the pleasures of virtue, distinguishing proprieties 
from manners, judgment from conventions, and proper pride from egotism. 
Mr. Darcy and Mr. Knightley, often accused of being proud, are appropri-
ately high-minded, properly proud of their virtue, representing a mean be-
tween extremes of excessive modesty and vanity. Being neither social nor 
concerned with what others think of them, Mr. Darcy and Mr. Knightley 
speak less than they act, and they act for others rather than for themselves. 
Virtue rather than money and power sets off these heroes and earns them 
the gratitude of men and women alike. Religion undergirds the morality of 
Austen's heroes and heroines, but virtue is never solely a matter of religious 
faith or dogmatic obedience, not even in Persuasion or Mansfield Park, the 
most explicitly religious of Austen's novels. Individual morality supersedes 
evangelical or Anglican fervor, for virtue or its lack is practiced devotedly 
not devoutly. Moderation even in religion makes for happiness on earth. 
The Pleasures of Virtue elucidates jane Austen's characters in opposition to 
the prevailing political thought of Austen's time. But the result is a timeless 
exposition of the human capacity for reason and virtue that leads to happi-
ness, to the principal pleasures of life. Being constant to principles may re-
quire self-sacrifice, but none of Austen's heroes or heroines are saints. 
Instead they are decidedly human, courageous in speech, generous in action, 
and rewarded by happiness for having virtue. This essay is a fine study of 
moderation and a promising first book from a scholar who practices the 
moderation Jane Austen herself endorses. 
Smith College Patricia L. Skarda 
The 'Lucy Poems': A Case Study in Literary Knowledge by Mark jones. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995. Pp. 336. $55.00. 
The subtitle of Mark jones's new book, "A Case Study," is something of 
misnomer in that it does not merely illuminate a specific problem in literary 
knowledge, it sheds light on the entire field of literary study. If Words-
worth's lyrics about or over the subject of "Lucy" provide a site of interpre-
tive doubt rather than knowledge, and therefore offer an ideal locus for the 
study jones undertakes, these lyrics (as well as their interpretive history) 
also provide the impetus for a thoughtful re-situation of the interpretive im-
perative and its consequences. The 'Lucy Poems': A Case Study in Literary 
Knowledge is for this alone a remarkable book; but for Wordsworthians it will 
also prove a dense and richly rewarding one. It is, in fact, one of those rare 
books that provokes in the reader the wish to have written it him- or herself. 
The question that initiates the problem is: why are we so invested in the 
... 
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'Lucy Poems'? But certainly a more primary question grounds it: how did 
the 'Lucy' grouping come to be the present one, since it is not Wordsworth's 
own? 111€se questions together structure the problem: the editorial invest-
ment is not entirely separable from the critical investment, both of which re-
spond to but are not the inevitable projection of authorial investment. It is 
the very mystery that the 'Lucy Poems' represent that allows different claims 
to materialize around them, to turn the insubstantial into a centering and 
iconic keystone for the field. The 'Lucy Poems' are important to literary 
studies not because they are so very good, but because so much can be read 
into them, a richness that was certainly intended by their author but which 
is often broadened to even greater critical, philosophical, and literary weight 
and substance. Mark Jones sets up his case study to comprehend the histori-
cal as well as the present reception of the 'Lucy Poems,' their grouping and 
currently accepted ordering, and their uses for critical interpretation and 
theory. 
Wordsworth's 'Lucy Poems' became cemented during the mid-nineteenth 
century as consisting of the following poems in the following and familiar 
order: "Strange fits of passion," "She dwelt among th' untrodden ways," "I 
travelled among unknown men," "Three years she grew in sun and shower," 
and" A slumber did my spirit sea!." These five poems provide, along with 
Keats's six odes and Coleridge's conversation poems, the touchstones of 
Romantic period studies, the poems we can teach to our students as em-
bodying the mystery and artistry of the literary imagination. These are our 
disciplinary fascinations, love affairs that we transfer to students often with-
out the accompanying reasons that justify such passion. And this is a com-
pounded and textured love we hold for these works, composed of what our 
own teachers have taught us about loving texts as much as of what we our-
selves have discovered. The loyalties multiplied in our literary passions can 
be too cherished for us to want to question or analyze their cost basis, and so 
it is fortunate that Jones sets about demystifying them and their attraction 
for us. Because we can no longer uphold the kind of Victorian and early 
Modern purviews that reified and biographically identified the artwork, 
those projects that first endowed the 'Lucy' grouping with such value, we 
need to understand the history and the context of those earlier projects, and 
consequently the condition of our literary love. "The important question, fi-
nally, is not whether a given grouping is right, but what the readerly activity 
invited by Wordsworth's text can reveal about the functions of both provoca-
tion and response" (12). The puzzle is a considerable one: these are poems 
that discourse about interpersonal love but that are tacitly about artistic love, 
evoke textual love from their readers. How vulnerable are we to this trian-
gtllated passion, one which is the mediated product of generations of edi-
tors, scholars, theorists-in short, an institutional rather than purely poetic 
feat? And what do the institutional conditions of this love cost us, particu-
larly at the intellectual level? 
Jones argues that our relation to the 'Lucy' texts, a relation I have been as-
signing an affective nature although he does not, is a case in point of "the 
modem literature institution's will to knowledge." The 'Lucy Poems,' that is, 
open themselves up in such a way that they demand interpretive interven-
tion, thus facilitating the process of "legitimat[ing] 'English' as a 'discipline' 
J __ _ 
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capable of producing 'knowledge,'" because the indeterminacies of the 
'Lucy' texts were always suppressed through the interpretive process in or-
der to produce such knowledge. Put another way, our affective relation to 
the 'Lucy Poems' has such power over us because the cost basis is integral to 
the value of our discipline; we love the thing that has the power to grant our 
activity institutional, social, and political value; we love to expend its rich-
ness to both taste that power and the lovely mystery of its suppressed articu-
lation. On the other hand, the indeterminacies of the 'Lucy' texts also give us 
some pain since they will not reduce to sheer knowledge, and the more free-
dom we allow ourselves interpretively over these texts, as Jones points out, 
the less we are able to contain and define our 'knowledge.' 
Jones not only engages the enigma of the 'Lucy Poems' in itself and within 
criticism, but he broadens the problem to the academy by wondering how 
the sociopolitical critique of the institution today by a critic like Terry Eagle-
ton, for instance, takes into account the historical reception of the 'Lucy 
Poems.' These were poems composed in a period that saw the "Rise of En-
glish as a modem institution, but it also [saw] the rise of 'theory' and consid-
erable changes in the specific practices of criticism," and Jones urges that 
these three be viewed not disparately as Eagleton does, but "as cognate 
functions" that sit in relation to larger social contexts, particularly democra-
tizing ones (55). So, too, the change in the early judgmental and analytic Re-
views to the more subjective and interpretive Magazines of the nineteenth 
century might perhaps map out a similar critical response to literature today 
as we ourselves move between interpretation and analysis in our critical 
writing; moreover, the shift "epitomizes the liberalization of 'the institution 
of criticism' since the romantic period" (59). The recurrences, fascinating as 
they are, that the case study of Lucy reveals in institutional practice, ration-
ale, and self-propagation, are spun out not in order to refute Eagleton but to 
set him straight. As valuable as this is for us (and as much as we might wish 
him to push it further), Jones confines his critique to clearing the ground for 
his study of Lucy, subjugating it to her. 
But who is Lucy? That, finally, becomes the centering question for Jones, 
and it is the one that causes him most trouble in this otherwise elegant book. 
As he points out, Lucy cannot be the grandmotherly figure of "Dear Child of 
Nature" with her "old age serene and bright"; whether a young woman or a 
child, she must be eternally young. Representing the immortality of youth, 
Lucy signifies (or perhaps is) that quality of the child that makes death in-
conceivable. Or, she Signals the youth in immortality as represented by one 
who dies young. Both of these conceptualizations of death or not-death are 
vessels for the mystery we weave about life and spirit by way of an emo-
tional nexus that allows us to bind these into some kind of certitude that is 
strong enough to contain mystery and doubt, but at a distance. Lucy is the 
container for this certitude and this doubt in the Wordsworthian canon; 
Keats's odes and Coleridge's conversation poems offer more formal, less fig-
urative kinds of containers. But the figure is an extremely powerful medium, 
which is what allows critics to go beyond the authorial project of the 'Lucy' 
poems. The pre-sexual being, in this case the female with her cultural conno-
tations for the desiring reader, represents potential rather than experience, 
and because of this convention we accept Wordsworth's consignment of this 
1 
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mystery to the young girl-whose figurative or literal death is the only way 
to stabilize the mystery she contains. 
So far so good, but Jones never fully accounts for the substantive differ-
ence between the 'Lucy' figure of the five editorially agreed-upon poems of 
the 'Lucy' grouping, and the young girls caught in a similar life-death nexus 
in poems Jones mentions as near 'Lucy' poems such as "Louisa," II Among all 
lovely things my Love had been," and "Lucy Gray." Nor does he account for 
why certain poems are not considered in the context of the elusive 'Lucy' 
quality, such as "We Are Seven," with its similar death-enmeshed maiden, 
"'Tis said that some have died for love," where the speaker and maiden are 
more fully realized figures and the title is very similar in tone, or even liThe 
Sparrow's Nest"-for given the sheer weight of consideration placed on the 
Lucy configuration, it is not enough to dismiss a poem from consideration 
for using a name other than "Lucy." That is to say, the 'Lucy Poems' sit at 
the center of an economic circulation of desire and mystery that we value 
over thought and analysis. Obviously, it was never Jones's task or intention 
to discover other 'Lucy' poems, but we need to understand even more 
clearly just why these five poems and no others belong to the canonical 
grouping. I do not argue with Jones's conclusions, but rather with his not 
helping us understand clearly enough why we are so wed to these particular 
lyrics and no others. 
Another difficulty arises out of this first one. Although Jones does call 
"Louisa" a "borderer" poem to the 'Lucy' grouping, he doesn't pay enough 
attention to borderers themselves-neither the border poems to the Lucy 
grouping and what they have to tell us, nor to the border quality of Lucy 
herself. Nor does he consider the "Border" geography that the Lake District 
neighbors, or even the border state of alien subjectiVity that both William 
and Dorothy Wordsworth experienced during their ghastly winter in Goslar. 
Wordsworth's play The Borderers, even if only by its title, should be a pointer 
to these other considerations. 
Finally, what leads Jones to ignore the importance of the border modality 
i is his refusal to engage psychological or psychoanalytic critical theories, and 
, he therefore ignores the psychological properties of the Wordsworthian 
imagination-not in terms of the psychobiographical, which he rightly, I 
think, rejects, but in terms of understanding border states, border beings, 
and Wordsworth's own projections of the imaginative imperative. It is his 
resistance of this aspect of the social that leads Jones to misread a crucial 
passage in Geoffrey Hartman's Wordsworth's Poetry, 1878-1814 which dis-
" cusses border modalities and which, had Jones allowed it, would have shed 
1 light on the irksome question of Lucy's ontology. Jones finds Hartman's 
i analysis to be "wavering" because he does not name a physically real Lucy, 
but what Jones refuses to take seriously is Hartman's reference to Lucy as an 
"intermediate" or "boundary being." "This wavering [between 'being' and 
'modality']," Jones remarks, "might be supposed to wean us from strictly 
I biographical identifications" (88). But Hartman's point is that once we come 
to view the poems more familiarly, we see that she is not a being so much as 
a "modality" who has the potential to remain spirit, or to become human-
ized much in the same way that the emergent poet has the choice of becom-
ing a practicing poet or of letting his creative self die off in an easy death in 
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nature. This question of a psychologically comprehensible intermediacy is 
very much related to the formal question of poems that are intermediary to 
the 'Lucy' grouping. Wordsworth was clearly very interested in the concept 
of border states, whether physical, formal, psychological, or spiritual. Clear-
ly, Jones uses Hartman in this passage on Lucy to show how the institutional 
imperative co-opts criticism, but to dismiss the question is not only reduc-
tive, it limits the insight of Jones's very accomplished institutional critique. 
Clearly Jones has invested in the physical and social rather than psychologi-
cal (or psychic) reality of Lucy; by subjugating everything in his study to 
her, he buys into her reality in a way that Eagleton might well criticize in re-
turn. 
My complaints about Jones's refusal to take the border state seriously 
should not be taken as any reason not to read and deeply appreciate this 
book. Jones is very generous with his insights, offering nearly one per page. 
Wordsworthians should read this book: for those who are not and never will 
be Wordsworth enthusiasts or specialists, this book offers an institutional 
history and critique that can be widely applied within literary studies, and 
that is worth reading for its own sake. 
Univ. of Massachusetts-Boston Elizabeth Pay 
Feminist Conversations: Fuller, Emerson, and the Play of Reading by Christina 
Zwarg. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. x + 302. $39.95 cloth; 
$16.95 paper. 
Margaret Fuller is best remembered for her influence on others and her 
conversation rather than for her writing. The tendency among feminists to-
day is to resurrect Fuller's literary writings, but except for Woman in the 
Nineteenth Century, her writings are not memorable. Much of it, particularly 
Summer on the Lakes, is slow reading embellished with examples of her vast 
frame of reference and excellent education (which she liked to flaunt). Pull-
er's poetry is flat and her lines are apt to be stilted. Puller does not really 
know how to tell a story, which is why her writing is most accessible in her 
journalism and literary reviews. Fuller said that as a Transcendentalist, "she 
had an active mind frequently busy with large topics" (Letter 1837 to Caro-
line Sturgis). This is aptly descriptive. For Fuller, conversation was a con-
genial means for self-expression; for Ralph Waldo Emerson, her most famous 
friend, conversation was an outgrowth of the sermon and the inherent style 
of the familiar essay at which he was adept. One could say that they both 
thought in conversation, but Emerson wrote his out, while Fuller spoke hers, 
and lost them in air. The loss is ours, and I especially wish that Fuller were 
available on video tape or CD Rom. 
For twenty-five years, feminists and other readers of American literature 
have been carefully analyzing Fuller's literature and personal correspon-
dence trying to place her in a context showing her importance as writer, the-
orist, and influence. Christina Zwarg finds fault with some literary critics 
who, she says, have not taken Fuller as seriously as she does, but her study 
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Feminist Conversations hits the right chords and "seriously" examines Fuller's 
impact. Her thesis is that Fuller's thought and writing was a determined at-
tempt to gain power by embracing opportunities not open to women, to 
break from tradition, and to reduce the trappings of patriarchy: in short to 
see, feel, and think like a woman. It is difficult to get at Fuller's genius with-
out discussing her life, and because Zwarg's discussion of Fuller's life is 
scanty, Fuller's invigorating and often unpredictable personality is largely 
absent. 
Fuller was the editor of Dial (1839-1842), the best and most effective con-
duit for American Transcendentalism. After leaving the editorship, she trav-
eled and produced Summer on the Lakes (1844), which led to a job as literary 
critic at Horace Greeley's New-York Tribune (1844-1846). Fuller opted for in-
dependence, and moved to New York, where she produced her best, if not 
most vivacious, writings-approximately 250 reviews and general social crit-
icism. Additionally, she worked at recomposing Woman in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury (1845) and collected her reviews in Papers on Literature and Art (1846). 
Given her death at age 40, she was astonishingly productive, a dynamo of 
sorts. But her writing is often just not that good. Zwarg puts it rather clum-
sily when she says that Fuller tried to liberate "her genius from the artifice of 
artistic character by negotiating a new understanding of the relationship be-
tween public and private worlds, indeed by negotiating a shift away from 
the unsatisfactory categories of artist and genius together" (254). 
Zwarg attempts to broaden our awareness of Fuller's achievement by de-
voting considerable space to Fuller's youthful works: her translation of J. W. 
Goethe's Torquato Tasso (completed in 1835) and Bettina von Arnim's Gunder-
ode (1842). Zwarg thinks that these works are undervalued, for Fuller pro-
vides a "feminist component to translation" through which she set out to 
change the literary and cultural systems of her time. This argument asks for 
too much leniency. Fuller's essay "Bettine Brentano [von Arnim] and her 
Friend Gilnderode," published in Dial (1842) tells much about her relation-
ship with Emerson and less about von Arnim's relationship with Goethe, 
whom she idolized. Fuller rejected the classic hierarchical male/female rela-
tionship. This was the signature of her feminism, and she used this argu-
ment in her "Conversations," the lecture series that she was conducting in 
Boston at this time. Later, she developed this argument effectively in Woman 
in the Nineteenth Century. Zwarg tries hard to make a strong case for Fuller's 
feminist translations, but one can also argue that translation was a dead end 
for Fuller, since both the Tasso and the Gunderode were left unfinished and 
unpublished in her lifetime. 
Zwarg deepens the linkage between Fuller and Emerson: 
Fuller met Emerson as he was pulling away from the church, renounc-
ing the power of the clergy. At that point, she appeared to be moving 
in the opposite direction, attempting to gain power by embracing op-
portunities normally closed to women. But this reading is a superficial 
account of their difference .... Both were determined to break from 
tradition and both tended to define the break in linguistic terms; Emer-
son rejected the limited tropes of Christianity and Fuller rejected the 
limited tropes of society .... both maintained a faith in the subversive 
310 Criticism, Vol. XXXIX, no. 2: Book Reviews 
powers of the literary text to support their goal. The problem came 
when he [Emerson] had to reconcile their shared aspirations with the 
grammar of sexual and gender difference as it was managed by the 
culture. (41-42) 
Zwarg shows, successfully on the whole, how Fuller's friendship and the 
letters to him charged Emerson's imagination. They met in 1836; Fuller was 
26 and Emerson was 33. He was then completing Nature, and there followed 
a personal and epistolary relationship that lasted until Fuller's death in 1850. 
Ironically, the friendship continued on as Emerson edited and wrote a liter-
ary tribute to Fuller, Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli (1851). Zwarg devotes 
much space to a discussion of Emerson's manner of dealing with the text 
and Fuller's death. When Fuller died, Emerson wrote "I have lost in her my 
audience." He was deeply touched by her pathetic death. Fuller was en 
route from Italy when her ship foundered off the coast of Fire Island. She, 
her husband Giovanni Ossoli, and infant child Angelo were drowned. Emer-
son dispatched Henry Thoreau to the scene, but all that Thoreau could ob-
tain was a button he ripped from a jacket he thought belonged to Ossoli. 
In 1840, Fuller wrote about her relationship with Emerson: "His friendship 
is only strong inference and he weights and balances, buys and sells you and 
himself all the time. I love to keep the flower shut till my breeze and then 
open its blushful bloom to the friend alone. He would wait till esteem was 
challenged. I till the chain of affinity vibrated" (Jan 22, 1840). The metaphor 
here has a sexual undertone. Zwarg thinks that the relationship was platonic, 
but she makes the point that there was always something in it that kept 
Emerson on edge. She mentions (several times) that Emerson had a sense of 
panic when learning that some of Fuller's personal letters had been found 
washed ashore after the shipwreck. Actually, Fuller had secured their corre-
spondence with a friend in Italy. But Emerson sensed that his freedom of 
expression might embarrass him. 
Fuller generally looks away from America as a source of literature. Her 
writings are peppered with quotations and references to the Europeans and 
classical mythology; less frequently is an American author, except for Emer-
son, used as a resource. Notations by commentators busily explain references 
that prove Fuller's wide range and extensive knowledge of the classics and 
European literature, but references to American authors dealing with Ameri-
can themes are less frequent, and she tends to dismiss them. Europe was 
Fuller's Mecca. She looked East across the Atlantic even when she toured the 
prairies of Illinois and described them in Slimmer 011 the Lakes (1844), record-
ing <I trip along the Great Lakes from Buffalo to Chicago and the prairies be-
yond. Fuller liked the prairies best. Because this is one of Fuller's full-scale 
published works, it is treated with a seriousness that it probably does not 
dcscrn?, SUlIllller is not good travel literature and generally lacks a sense of 
pbcc. Fuller's complaint that Washington Irving's descriptions of the region 
"lack brc<1th and glow, the charming minute traits of living presence," <lpply 
more sc\'crcly to Fuiter's own text. Zwarg emphasizes the American aspects 
of SUlIJ/J/t'r <lnd makes it seem a better book than it probably is by reading it 
as lin eXJ.mplc of the double strategy, story and feminist argument. The 
thel11eS for her book tell it <III: the hardship and isolation of women in the 
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new communities, cultural dullness, the generally negative influence of com-
merce on character, the contrast of Indian life before European settlement 
and its present squalid condition. There aTe some scenes in which Fuller in-
forms the reader of what she sees and feels, but I suspect that the natural 
scene never charged Fuller's imagination. During the trip, she was always 
thinking and making connections for revising "The Great Lawsuit: Man ver-
sus Men" which was to be published in the July 1843 issue of Dial. 
It's my guess that Fuller's talk about her summer on the lakes was much 
more enlivening and dynamic than what she wrote. Summer on the Lakes be-
gins at Niagara Falls where Fuller seems to have worked hard to register the 
feeling of awe associated with a scene of natural sublimity. In the end, Fuller 
decided that the rapids below the falls in moonlight best satisfied her roman-
tic spirit. nus is backward, until you accept the possibility that Fuller was 
not thrilled with the whole episode. Summer on the Lakes is not in the same 
league as Harriet Martineau's Society in America (1837) which Fuller strongly 
criticized because Martineau criticized Transcendentalism as being faddish 
and called Boston the headquarters of cant. Zwarg suggests that Fuller's re-
action to Niagara Falls is a textbook esthetic experience (wonder followed by 
awe). But she thinks that Fuller feminized the experience by recalling the 
dread of Indians attacking defenseless women. Zwarg links Fuller's vision of 
awe with the subject of John Vanderlyn's painting "The Death of Jane Mc-
Crea" (1804). This is a good match-up, but given Fuller's penchant for elabo-
ration, one wonders if she invented this vision during the' writing process. 
Zwarg is too kind to Fuller's Summer, though she is closest to the mark, I 
think, when she points out that "nearly a third of the work is a lengthy de-
scription of her reading during her trip and later, as she was composing the 
narrative." (102) In fact, Fuller did much post-trip reading for her travel 
book in the Harvard Library. Joan Von Mehren notes that Fuller was the first 
woman to be granted the privilege of using the library and that the sight of a 
woman in the reading room must have been shocking to the male students. 
Fuller's public speaking, unlike Emerson's, was conducted largely behind 
closed doors. Fuller's "Conversation" conducted for the women of her circle 
in Boston and Cambridge were never published. They were for women only, 
and only one "Conversation" permitted men to attend. The "Conversations" 
seem to have been attempts at participatory lectures: Fuller would discourse 
on a selected topic, and then, having inspired her audience, she would try to 
engage them in a dialog. The conversations were conducted between 1841-
1844. Even Emerson, who praised her writing, thought that "her powers of 
speech throw her writing into the shade." On the other hand, Horace Gree-
ley thought very highly of Fuller's writing, and after the publication of Sum-
mer, he signed her to a contract as critic and cultural columnist, which 
continued when Fuller traveled in Europe from 1846-1850. 
Zwarg's study is concerned with giving Fuller her due and reevaluating 
her contribution to the culture and letters of her time and the present. Fuller 
is not a marginal figure, and Zwarg tries to understand Fuller as a feminist 
and conventional critic. She has succeeded, and in the process has written at 
least MO books in one: a text that is feminist and a scholarly apparatus that 
is conventional. The MO books coalesce largely thanks to an inspired deci-
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sian to place the footnotes, which are succinct and helpful, at the bottom of 
each page. 
This study is more about Fuller and less about Emerson. One of Zwarg's 
aims is to persuasively demonstrate Fuller's "mutually empowering, and in-
teractive" literary relationship with Emerson. Was Fuller merely Emerson's 
Muse, or was she Emerson's Minerva? Without providing a definitive an-
swer, Zwarg explains that Fuller was both, and the rest I leave the reader of 
her study to untangle. Emerson looms large throughout. Ironically, Zwarg 
gives him the last word. The last section of the text is a discussion of the 
Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli which Emerson edited and to which he 
wrote a major piece. It was his way of making his peace with Fuller and 
mourning her death. It was also an attempt at securing Fuller's reputation 
and laying to rest the scandal of her romance with Ossoli: "Emerson discov-
ered that the audience for his projected Memoirs was rather suspicious of 
Fuller's liberation in Italy and grateful that she failed to liberate the United 
States in the same fashion. The recovery of her liberating powers, which 
Emerson believed in, given his sense of the intellectual crisis in America, 
was complicated by the culture's reading of those powers as merely erotic, 
echoing in a vulgar ",ay his own sense of their potential efficacy" (240). 
Zwarg also shows' that Emerson's "Woman" (a lecture before the Boston 
Woman's Rights Convention 1855) and the essay "Fate" (published in 1860) 
were composed with Fuller in mind. The process by which Emerson com-
bined his sense of loss and composed his own work is neatly developed by 
Zwarg, and she makes a strong case for accepting that here especially Full-
er's "life becomes integral to the figurative play and historical intervention 
of his work" (240). Zwarg shows how Fuller influenced Emerson as a person 
in conversation and as muse for his creative writing. Her final example 
adroitly points this out. In his journals, Emerson wrote, "A personal influ-
ence towers up in memory the only worthy force when we would gladly for-
get numbers or money or climate, gravitation & the rest of Fate. Margaret, 
whenever she came, fused people into society, & a glOWing company was 
the result. When I think how few persons can do that feat for the intellectual 
class, I feel our squalid poverty" (294). When he finished "Fate," this passage 
became less personal and more universal and conventional: "Only one way I 
is right to go; the hero sees it, and moves on that aim, and the world under 
him for root and support." Zwarg's point is that the shift in wording, mak- \ 
ing Margaret a universal hero, is evidence of Emerson's advocacy of Fuller. 
Zwarg wonders how many of Emerson's readers would recognize the veiled 
reference to Fuller. How many modern readers make the connection? Herein ! 
lies part of the problem of defining Fuller's influence. It is not easily or im- I· 
mediately recognized and must be demonstrated. This is a task that is worth 
~~ I Zwarg is on sure ground when she discusses Fuller's influence on Emer- I 
son's Second Series (1844). She is kind to Emerson's feminist perspective and ',. 
thinks that "his uneasiness looks considerably more alluring when we con-
sider the range of issues at hand in the project of defining a feminist perspec-
tive for the conduct of life." (128) The light of mutual influence is brightest 
betvveen Second Series and Woman in the Nineteenth Century, and she thinks 
that in the Second Series, Emerson consciously used Fuller as a shaping figure 
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and Charles Fourier, the social reformer, as the catalyst (132). In their discus-
sions of the problem of marriage and social reform, Fuller and Emerson ac-
cepted Fourier's contention that society is degraded by demeaning women 
through the patriarchal structure. At the time both read and studied Fourier, 
Fuller and Emerson grew unexpectedly close partly as the result of the death 
of Emerson's brother Charles and after the death of his son Waldo. Zwarg 
thinks that Emerson's grief brought hiIn to consider Fourier's idea that reas-
serting the original "paSSionate attractions" in human nature one can thwart 
social prejudice and reform. The confluence of influences led Emerson, 
Zwarg contends, to be susceptible to Fuller's argu1l1ents, particularly in his 
advocacy of the rights of women. 
Zwarg says that Fuller "initiates her 'feminism' through her reading-
which is to say, through the activity of translation and literary criticism, 
shifting only then to a theory of history as an act of reading ... " (8). Zwarg 
complains, wrongly I think, that Bell Cale Chevigny's The Woman and the 
Myth (1976) is old-fashioned literary criticism and is not feminist enough. On 
the other hand, what is one to make of Zwarg's attempt at contemporary 
criticism when she states that "The ensemble we call Fuller (her life and 
work) reads like an indecipherable text because she participated in its prod-
uction"? Fortunately, Zwarg makes sense of Fuller's texts, though she might 
have given more information about Fuller's life-information that is avail-
able in several recent biographies particularly Charles Capper's Margaret 
Fuller, American Romantic (1992) and Joan Von Mehren's Minerva and the 
lvlouse (1994). Zwarg's concern is to show that Fuller meant to provide a rad-
ical theory of feminisln through all of her reading and writing and that this 
"provides a clue to her Significance for our understanding of Emerson's de-
velopment and theoretical foundations of feminist criticism today." (8) Is 
Zwarg felninist enough? Is Fuller feminist enough? I think that the answer to 
both is yes. 
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